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Abstract
Even though gender equity in academia has been extensively studied, female fac-
ulty are still consistently hired at lower ranks, paid lower salaries and promoted less
frequently than men.1
Previous work has focused on the individual faculty member as a study unit
and, in most applications, on a single academic reward or representation outcome.
However, existing approaches are insufficient to assess equity at institutional level for
single-institution studies, from a causal inference perspective.
How do differential gender practices in awarding salaries and ranks affect insti-
tutional measures of prestige and investment? In this dissertation we developed a
simulation-based approach to estimate and conduct inference for gender equity out-
comes defined at institution level and investigate how gender disparities along indi-
vidual careers contribute to institutional measures.
The statistical challenge in addressing these issues corresponds to the estimation
of higher-level causal effects in complex systems for which only one observation of
the outcomes of interest is available. The methods proposed combine faculty-level
ii
models that describe the academic career with a university-level, i.e., an aggregate-
level, definition of causal effect.
We applied these methods to simulated data based on an existing university.
We found that the simulated institution does not deviate significantly from gender
neutrality in terms of departures from the institution and total time in higher ranks
for female faculty in 2005-2013. However, under a counterfactual gender-neutral
scenario, the total compensation paid to female faculty over these 9 years would have
been 2.8% higher (95% CI [1.2%, 4.4%]). The main determinant of this disparity is
the significantly lower initial salaries for female faculty, with women earning 6.0% less
on average at-hire than otherwise similar men.
This analysis aims to complement individual-level gender equity studies with an
institutional perspective, to aid in the achievement of a more gender-neutral struc-
ture in academia. Furthermore, the methods proposed have wide applications to other
complex systems and designs, such as health agencies networks, pharmaceutical mar-
ket dynamics and transportation systems.
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Gender equity in academia is a topic that has been extensively studied since the
early 1920s. At that time, amid the women’s rights movement and the ratification of
the 19th Amendment, scholars began to assess the presence of women among teaching
staff in colleges and universities, and to pay attention to salary, ranks and promotion
rate differentials between female and male faculty.
Today however, more than 50 years after the amendment of title VII forbidding
sex-based discrimination in US higher education, female faculty are still consistently
hired at lower ranks,2 paid lower salaries3 and promoted less frequently than men.4
Salary, promotions and academic rank constitute components of a complex5 pro-
fessional reward system that reflects an institution’s needs, priorities and goals. As
mechanisms to show value to its faculty members, salary, promotions and academic
rank constitute important determinants of productivity and job satisfaction, so as-
1
suring that male and female faculty have access to the same opportunities is of the
utmost importance.
Many approaches have been proposed to examine the influence of gender on aca-
demic rewards, the most commonly used being the Human Capital Theory.6 Under
this theory, gaps in salary, promotion rates and time to promotion are thought to
be the result of men and women having different levels of human capital variables
(education, experience and productivity), so that if a man has a higher salary than
a woman, it must be because he is better educated, more experienced or more pro-
ductive. However, many studies have shown that, even after accounting for these
variables, a portion of the gap remains unexplained.
The vast majority of gender equity research in academia has focused on the indi-
vidual faculty member as a study unit, using different types of regressions, structural
equation models, decomposition techniques, among others, that compare female fac-
ulty to otherwise similar male faculty (see Chapter 2). Most of these studies seek to
establish an association between gender and academic rewards, usually focusing on
only one of the academic reward components. Other studies have looked at causality
by staging experiments that prevent the institution from knowing a person’s gender
during hiring or consideration for promotion.
Most notably, methods are still needed to better assess gender equity at an institu-
tional level, from a causal inference perspective. How do differential gender practices
in awarding salaries, promotions and/or academic ranks affect the institution as a
2
whole in terms of its ability to retain faculty members and its desirability as a work-
place, as a function of the investment made in its faculty members?
The underlying statistical challenge in addressing these questions corresponds to
the estimation of higher-level causal effects in complex systems, i.e., the estimation of
causal effects for aggregated units (such as an institution) for which only one obser-
vation of the outcomes of interest is available, even though individual-level outcomes
are available for the sub-units that make up the system (e.g. faculty members) (see
section 3.1). Chapter 3 proposes a simulation based-method, similar to agent-based
modeling, to estimate and conduct inference for such higher-level causal effects.
Furthermore, we are interested in investigating how the components of the system
affect the system as a whole. Looking at gender equity at the institutional level, this
corresponds to assessing the effect of each step of a faculty member’s career to the
institutional causal effect. What are the sources of institutional gender disparities?
How much do differential rates of promotion for male and female faculty contribute
to institutional measures of gender partiality? Chapter 4 presents a regression-based
method to assess sources of information in complex systems, motivated by the sep-
aration of cross-sectional and longitudinal information to estimate the effect of an
intervention within a stepped wedge design.
The sensitive nature of gender equity data requires the use of methods that protect
the confidentiality of the individual faculty members as well as the institution until
results are ready to be published in an aggregated fashion. Therefore, the proposed
3
methods are tested on simulated data with known mechanisms of bias (Chapter 5) and
synthetic datasets that mimic information for faculty members of the Johns Hopkins
University (JHU) School of Medicine (SOM), between 2005 and 2013, for whom salary,
rank and other characteristics are recorded (Chapter 6). At the time of this study,
productivity measures were not available to incorporate in the analysis, so the role of
productivity in gender equity studies will be discussed but not implemented in this
particular application.
In an effort to understand, and address any gender disparities in academic re-
wards, in 2005 the JHU SOM established a Committee on Faculty Development and
Gender which conducts annual cross-sectional analyses monitoring the status of gen-
der disparities in salaries. This thesis aims to extend the efforts of the JHU SOM to
achieve a more gender-neutral structure.
Finally, Chapter 7 provides an overview of the proposed methods and its limita-
tions and a summary of the results obtained, along with a discussion of applications
other than gender equity, and topics for future research.
The rest of this chapter will be dedicated to setting up the necessary back-
ground information that motivates the proposed methods. The term “gender equity in
academia” requires special consideration, as each of its components has a very specific
meaning. We will describe the academic reward system and provide an overview of
the most common outcomes used in gender equity research. Finally, we will describe
the data motivating this research and address confidentiality concerns.
4
1.1 Gender equity in academia
The terms “sex” and “gender”, although sometimes used interchangeably, represent
different concepts with distinct implications for individuals in terms of health and
access to opportunities. Sex refers to the biological characteristics that distinguish
men and women (chromosomes, reproductive organs), while gender is a social and
cultural construct based on the biological sex differences, including behavior, roles,
self-representation, ideology, and psychological traits.7,8
Unger and Crawford note the issue with this distinction is not so much due to
terminology but to “unresolved conflicts within psychology about the causality of var-
ious sex-linked phenomena”,9 so that the term gender is preferred when emphasizing
that differences between men are women are a product of social phenomena. From a
causal inference perspective, it is important to then distinguish the mechanisms that
might produce such differences.
Holland and Rubin coined the maxim “There is no causation without manipula-
tion”,10 defining “causal variables” as those which can be intervened upon. This is the
case for example of the study of drug effectiveness, where a patient can be assigned
either the drug or a placebo. We then compare the outcome of the patient under the
treatment he was actually assigned, to the outcome the patient would have had, had
he been assigned to the other treatment, which is the definition of a causal effect.
However, many of the variables of interest in public health are not amenable to
causal statements given this definition. This is the case of gender, one of the most
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used variables in health and social studies. The issue with such attributes is that,
since they cannot be manipulated, their causal effects and counterfactual outcomes
are not well-defined.11 This challenge has given rise to extensive discussion in the
literature on whether it is even possible to assess causal effects in these cases.12–15
One approach to using attributes as causal variables is to shift the perspective of
measurement from the subject to the decision-maker, by using instead “perception
of the attribute”, which can be manipulated.16 Examples of this can be seen in
Bertrand et al. (2003), where names of applicants were changed in resumes to study
the influence of race in hiring decisions,17 and in Goldin et al. (1997) with the use of
“blind” auditions to study gender-biased hiring.18
We shall then define the casual variable of interest as gender partiality, as
differential practices by the decision-maker (intentional or otherwise) based on an
individual’s gender, as opposed to gender neutrality, where gender is ignored with
respect to opportunities within the institution. Note that this does not mean treating
men and women equally, but to ensure they have access to the same opportunities.
This concept is known as gender equity.19
There are situations, however, in which the decision-maker and the individual
need to interact face-to-face, making experiments such as the ones mentioned before
infeasible. This is the case of the interaction of an academic institution with its faculty
members, since individuals need to have some degree of presence at the institution to
collaborate on research and/or teach.
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Guzmán-Valenzuela and Cortés (2013) define an academic career as the formal
mechanism through which individuals move up hierarchical positions over time in
an academic institution.20 These mechanisms reflect the institution’s standards and
established procedures, as well as its goals and values. This concept is different
from academic trajectory, which involves the individual’s goals and hopes, while an
academic career is constrained by institutional practices.
An academic institution, viewed as the collective of its faculty members careers,
is a great example of a complex system.5,21 Institutional policies and actions can
be affected by labor market, economic and cultural conditions (contextual effects).
Events such as salary increases and promotions, may affect the decisions of faculty
members to stay or leave the institution (adaptivity), as well as performance. Perfor-
mance can, in return and through complex non-linear relationships, determine salary
and promotions (feedback loops).
Gender equity in academia has been analyzed from several different perspectives,
concentrating mostly on academic rewards (salary, promotion, rank) and female repre-
sentation at the institution. The percentage of female faculty has generally increased
over time, although there exist marked differences across fields.22 From 1921, when
12.0% of all teaching positions and 4.0% of full professorships in coeducational col-
leges and universities nationwide were held by women,23 with no woman holding any




Studies focusing on representation attempt to explain unequal sex ratios at hir-
ing, departure, or at some fixed point in time in terms of human capital variables,
productivity, academic climate, and satisfaction.
The analysis of representation at hiring focuses on three questions: are men and
women equally likely to: apply for an academic position, be made an offer of employ-
ment, and to accept an offer if one is made.
The composition of the applicant pool reflects both the practices and values of
the institution in the search and recruitment process, and market, social, cultural or
economic conditions in the pool of applicants. It follows that unequal gender ratios
may be outside the control of the institution.25 The decision to apply is determined
by characteristics of the institution and characteristics of the applicant,1 so without
records of actual applicants it might prove problematic to ascertain gender partiality
using national figures (such as the number of women with doctorates in the field) and
figures of new graduates would be relevant only to entry-level or assistant professor
rank. Furthermore, the candidate selection process “can be difficult to quantify”,1
since qualitative personality traits and fit to the institutions are important factors
that influence offers.
According to the National Science Foundation, 46.1% of doctorate recipients in
2014 were female, although this percentage is lower for the physical sciences and engi-
neering (28.7% and 22.9% respectively).26 Also for 2014, the Association of American
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Medical Colleges reports that 47.6% of medical graduates are female.27 However, the
percent of women who choose to pursue an academic career might be lower than the
fraction of men that do,1,28 but this varies largely by field and type of institution.
Out of the women who do apply, they are more likely than men to receive an offer.28
Some literature suggests that there might be bias in the hiring process, making
it more difficult for women with the same qualifications as men to be hired.1,29,30
However, Ceci and Williams (2010) report that in the case of math-intensive fields,
these disparities are due to “differences in resources, abilities and choice” instead of
discrimination,31 and hiring experiments have also shown a preference to hire female
faculty members in STEM.32
Female faculty attrition has been shown to be higher than male and to be linked
to job dissatisfaction, related to lack of opportunities, mentorship, advancement op-
portunities, and generally an unattractive work climate.1,33–35
1.1.2 Academic rewards
Studies focusing on academic rewards attempt to explain differences in salary
and rank as a function of institutional and individual characteristics, particularly
referring to human capital and performance measures (e.g. number of publications,
grants accepted, number of citations). Gender disparities usually manifest in one
of two ways: a different reward structure for female and male faculty (the return
on covariates is different by gender) or the same reward structure is present but a
9
constant factor for salary or rank is subtracted for women.36
The most prevalent research in this area are salary equity studies, with outcomes
such as salary-at-hire, changes in salary over time, or salary at a fixed point in
time.3,6, 37 Ranks have been studied in terms of rank-at-hire, at a fixed point or
over time, as well as probability of promotion, time to promotion and probability to
achieve tenured status, among other outcomes.38–40
Equity studies became popular in the late 1960s, following two important changes
in legislation. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 aimed at eliminating differences in wages
on the basis of sex, requiring equal pay for jobs performed under similar conditions
and that required the same level of “skill, effort and responsibility” (except in cases
where wages are determined by seniority, merit, quantity or quality of production, or
when wage differentials are based on factors other than sex).41 Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 further extended legislation by forbidding discrimination on the
basis of sex, race, religion or national origin, requiring that jobs that are of the same
value for the employer, even if they are very different jobs, should be compensated
equally.42 Title VII was further amended in 1972 to explicitly forbid discrimination
in academic employment.6
Even with these and newer changes in legislation1, research conducted over the
past 50 years suggests a differential favoring male faculty members, after accounting
for relevant covariates, that persists to this day.
1Such as the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 200943
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Studies using national datasets show that the earnings differences between male
and female faculty in science and engineering has decreased over time,44 with esti-
mated statistically-significant differences between -20.0% and -12.0% in the 1960s, and
-6.0% to -10.0% in the 1980s (with some studies showing no significant differences),
while recent single university studies show gaps lower than 5.0%. The University of
Minnesota found in 2011 that their male faculty were paid 2.2% more45 than their
female faculty2. At the University of California-Berkeley, 2015 data show that women
earn between 1.8% and 4.3% less than otherwise similar men.46 The College of Lib-
eral Arts at the University of Austin - Texas identified that salaries for female faculty
were between 2.0% (full-level) and 6.0% (assistant-level) lower than male’s (2013).47
The University of Indiana-Purdue found a 3.0% percent gap in average salaries in
2014, which has remained since 1998.48
Women in academic science and engineering have also been shown to be histori-
cally underrepresented in higher ranks and to have a lower chance of being promoted
than otherwise similar men in studies using national datasets.44 This trend has been
present since the 1960s with varying degrees of severity. Ash et al. (2004) and Jena
et al. (2014) show this trend also exists for women in academic medicine, with 66.0%
of men but only 47.0% of women with 15-19 years of seniority holding full professor-
ships in 1995-1996,49 and 11.9% versus 28.6% of full professor ranks going to women
in 2014.50
2Adjusting for variables thought to influence salary, with the exception of merit-related covariates,
which were not available.
11
1.2 Data and confidentiality
This study was motivated by annual gender equity reviews between 2005-2013
conducted by the Johns Hopkins Biostatistics Center on behalf of the JHU SOM
Committee On Faculty Development and Gender. Faculty included in the analyses are
full-time faculty in the ranks of Assistant Professor through Full Professor, excluding
deans, department and institute directors and faculty who were previously in these
leadership positions. Note that not all faculty members are followed for the same
period of time, reflecting the dynamic nature of academic employment.
The annual dataset contains information of salary, rank, and other demographic
characteristics of the faculty members including age, education and department. In-
formation is obtained from the SAP Enterprise Management System and validated
by the JHU SOM Registrar’s Office. Salary data corresponds to full-time equivalent
(FTE) salary, which is comprised of the base salary (part A) plus any supplemental
salary for administrative, educational or clinical roles assumed by the faculty (part
B) (FTE=A+B). The dataset also contains information on total salary, which adds
any bonuses (part C) defined in the individual departmental compensation plans or
that have been agreed upon by the faculty and department (Total salary=A+B+C).
This information, however, is necessarily confidential. Gender equity studies use
extremely sensitive information that, if made public could potentially harm faculty
or the institution, even if it is committed to gender equity in hiring, promotion, and
salary setting policies.
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In studies that use national datasets in which information from multiple univer-
sities is available, the name and location of the universities are suppressed to retain
confidentiality. Also, the use of multiple universities in an analysis, prevents iden-
tification of an individual faculty member and his/her personal characteristics or
conditions of employment.
However, for single university studies, care must be taken to protect both the
individual faculty members’ identity and the institution as a whole. This situation
has been addressed in the literature by adding noise to the data, excluding out-
liers or working with aggregated data to avoid identification of individual faculty
members. However, it has been noted that these techniques may not fully protect
anonymity51 and may compromise data usability and conclusion validity.52 One ap-
proach to overcome these limitations is the use of multiply imputed synthetic data:
datasets generated by sampling from a hypothesized data generating mechanism, so
that a set of characteristics of the original data are preserved, e.g. moments of the
joint distribution. Inferences are obtained by combining results from all datasets.53
For this thesis, a single synthetic dataset was generated from the JHU SOM data,
and this dataset was used in place of the institutions’ original data. Note
that in this case only a single dataset is needed, since the goal is neither to estimate
population parameters nor to make inferences for the original data, but to have a
dataset with which to test methods while preserving the confidentiality of faculty
members and the institution as a whole.
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The synthetic dataset was constructed in two stages:
1. Generation of the initial characteristics of faculty members.
First, characteristics of both existing faculty members at the institution at the
beginning of the study (year 2005) and newly hired faculty members for each
subsequent year in the study (years 2005 to 2013) were generated.
The number of unique faculty members, i.e., distinct faculty members who are
present at the institution at least one year, was chosen to be similar to the
number of unique faculty members at the JHU SOM in the period 2005-2013.
Each one of these unique faculty members is assigned a year of entry to the
dataset by sampling with replacement from the distribution of JHU SOM.
The rest of the faculty characteristics at entry are generated using non-parametric
“simple synthesis”.54 This procedure uses regression and classification trees to
predict the faculty characteristic of interest as a function of chosen covariates
using a prediction algorithm that is driven by the data and makes no parametric
assumptions.
Each variable in the dataset is then generated as a prediction from a model that
conditions on the variables that precede it in the dataset. The faculty charac-
teristics are generated sequentially as follows: department, gender, race, age,
degree, arrival3, rank, time in rank and FTE salary. This means that, for ex-
ample, gender is generated conditioning on year, department, and existing/new
3Whether the faculty member is a new hire or not
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hire status. This process continues until the generation of FTE salary, which is
based on all the preceding faculty characteristics.
2. Generation of the longitudinal academic careers.
The longitudinal academic careers were synthesized following the logic presented
in Figure 3.3. Conditional on initial characteristics, we used the parametric
career models defined in section 3.3.2 to simulate the promotion, change in
salary and departure processes.
For the rest of this work, we shall refer to the generated synthetic data as data
for University X.
1.3 Gender equity at University X: descrip-
tive analyses
University X had a total of 2458 unique faculty members with information for
at least one year in the period 2005-2013, with the size of the institution increasing
from 1362 faculty members in 2005 to 1654 in 2013 (Figure 1.1a). University X hires
on average 130 new faculty members each year (standard deviation SD=25), and 85
faculty members depart on average each year (SD=20).
By 2013, University X employed 38.0% women (Figure 1.1a) and 7.5% underrep-
resented minorities, an increase from 32.1% and 5.7% respectively in 2005, and with a
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faster increase for female underrepresented minorities (9.3% versus 6.4% for males in
2013). The percentage of new hires who are women at University X averages 41.4%
with a peak of 47.0% in 2008.
The majority of faculty members (92.2%) stay at least 10 years at the institution,
with very similar time distributions for female and male faculty. The number of
women leaving University X has increased over time, with approximately 40.0% of
departures being female faculty members in the period 2010-2013.
The difference in median age for female as compared to male faculty varied from
between 2.2 years (2006) and 4.6 years (2011). For 2013, the median ages were 48.0
and 43.8 years for male and female faculty members respectively.
Approximately 73.0% of faculty members have MD degrees, while 13.5% have PhD
degrees. This distribution has not changed over time, with slightly lower proportions
for female faculty with an MD degree (70.0%) and declining number of female PhD
holders (13.4% in 2005 versus 10.2% in 2013).
Ranks at University X have remained relatively stable over time at the ratio 2:1:1
for Assistant, Associate and Full Professors (Figure 1.1b). This distribution however
is different by gender. For 2013, 57.4% of female faculty were at the Assistant rank,
compared to 46.1% among male faculty. As rank increases, the percentage of female
faculty is smaller: for 2013, 43.3%, 36.9% and 28.1% of Assistant, Associate and Full
rank positions respectively were held by women.
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A total of 442 faculty members were promoted in 2005-2013, 35 of whom were
promoted more than once. 65.4% of the faculty members promoted once and 80.0%
of the faculty members promoted twice were male. Median time in rank is similar
for female and male faculty in Assistant and Associate ranks, but male faculty have
longer time at Full professor rank (11.4 years versus 8.9 for females).
On average, 90.0% of newly hired faculty members are hired at the Assistant
Professor level. Average initial salaries for new Assistant Professors at University
X have increased from approximately 107,600$ (SD=27,613$) in 2005 to 141,000$
(SD=33,395$) in 2013, although this varies by department, with the average ini-
tial salary by department ranging from 93,400$ in 2013 (SD=23,276$) to 163,500$
(SD=83,595$).
Initial average salary for women hired as Assistant Professors has been historically
lower than males, although this difference is not statistically significant in unadjusted
analyses except for 2007 and 2013, when female initial salaries were on average 20,329$
(p=0.0016) and 11,806$ (p=0.0542) lower than males, respectively.
Over time, women experience 0.3% higher average annual increases in salary than
men (p<0.001) (Figure 1.1c).
All of these results represent unadjusted analyses of individual-level gender equity
measures. Confounding variables such as human capital and performance/productivity
were not taken into account. Chapter 2 will deal with existing statistical techniques





approaches to asses gender equity
Despite the enormous capabilities of existing statistical approaches to assess gen-
der equity, these methods are insufficient to investigate equity at the institutional
level for single-institution studies, from a causal inference perspective. Section 3.1
will elaborate on the specific challenges of shifting the perspective of measurement
from the individual to the institution, while section 3.3 will propose a method that
extends existing approaches to assess gender equity at institution level.
This section then focuses on describing the most common statistical methods that
have been used to assess gender equity at the individual level in the literature, i.e., to
assess the association between gender and academic rewards outcomes measured for
each faculty member. Then, individual faculty members are used as replications
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of the perception and action of the institution on a person’s gender, and these results
are used to reach conclusions at the institution level.
In terms of study design, literature on equity studies varies widely as a function
of the number of universities included in the study (single or multiple), the number
of disciplines included (single or multiple), the type of design (observational or ex-
perimental), and the number and nature of time points to analyze (cross-sectional,
repeated independent samples or longitudinal data).
The 1970s were characterized by cross-sectional, single university studies that
aimed at evaluating salary systems, determining the methodology to assess inequities,
monitor changes in policies and implement actions regarding sex-discrimination claims.55
With the availability of national datasets, research in the 1980s focused on multi-
university studies using repeated cross-sectional samples over time, aimed at studying
trends and generalizing results from case studies, as well as assessing the effects of
anti-discrimination measures put into effect in the previous decade.55
This trend toward multi-university studies over time continued into the 1990s,
but more studies started to focus on methodological issues, such as the inclusion
of gender-biased covariates in regression models.55 Study designs and analytic tech-
niques evolved to reflect the need for more sophisticated analysis, that could take into
account the multidimensionality of the problem.
The most widely used statistical techniques to assess gender equity are regres-
sion models, but other techniques have also been used. Earlier studies were mostly
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unadjusted comparisons of means and percentages that were likely confounded by
variables known to be determinants of academic rewards and representation, such as
level of experience and productivity. Section 2.1 presents an overview, by no means
exhaustive, of methods used in the gender equity literature that allow to control for
potential confounders.
We finish this chapter with an adjusted analysis of the gender equity situation at
University X (section 2.3).
2.1 Existing methods
2.1.1 Matching
Also known as counterparting,6,56,57 matching involves paired comparisons of fe-
male faculty to male faculty with the same or similar key characteristics such as rank
and measures of productivity. This technique was commonly used in the 1970s and
1980s when the number of female faculty members was smaller. Sets of matches
were sent to a review committee to evaluate academic rewards and determine if an
adjustment should be made.
This approach is largely qualitative because it relies on opinions of a committee
for evaluation making it prone to gender biases. It carries the additional problem that
matches might be difficult to find in high dimensional space. There is also the risk of
over-matching,57 that is, matching on variables in the causal pathway of gender bias.
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2.1.2 Compa-ratios
Bereman and Scott (1991) suggested the use of compa-ratios58 in single-university
studies as an alternative to regression techniques, to avoid issues of interpretability
while still being able to adjust for rank, discipline, productivity and time-in-rank.
Compa-ratios are obtained by dividing individual salaries by the salary midpoint for
faculty in the same “pay grade" (faculty with the same rank and field for example),
and the ones that fall below a certain threshold are reviewed for potential causes of
low pay (such as productivity).6 This technique requires the assumption that rank
and academic field are not affected by gender biases.
2.1.3 Multivariable regression
Multivariable regression in any of its forms (linear1, logistic,22,39,59 probit,60,61
proportional hazards models,38,40,62 random effects models,63–65 among others) is the
method of choice for analyzing gender equity in representation and academic rewards.
The popularity of these techniques is based on the fact that regression models can
accommodate different natures of outcomes and predictors, and they allow the esti-
mation of differences between female and male faculty while adjusting for potential
confounders.
1See Loeb and Ferber (1971), Katz (1973), Farber (1977), Hirsch and Leppel (1981), Tolbert
(1986), Pfeffer and Ross (1990), Formby (1993), Ginther (1999), Monks and Robinson (2000), Toutk-
oushian et al. (2007), and Binder et al. (2010), just as a few examples.
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The simplest regression approach is the single-equation method, in which a single
regression model is fitted to the all the data, including both female and male faculty
members. In this case, gender is included in the model as a dummy variable and
its coefficient reflects the “unexplained” differences between females and males after
adjusting for the rest of the variables in the model. This approach assumes that
the gender effects on salary or promotion are the same for different values of the
covariates, i.e., the reward structure is the same for female and male faculty.
The assumption of equal reward structure may not hold, however. Female and
male faculty might be rewarded differently as a function of their characteristics. For
example, while a male faculty member might get an increase in salary of 500$ for
each additional publication, a woman might get 250$ only. This can be incorporated
into the model by adding interaction terms with gender74 or by running separate
regressions by gender (multiple-equation method).75 The coefficients for the female
and male models can then be compared using Chow’s test60,70 or differences in means
tests.76,77 This approach has the problem that each model is run on a smaller sample,
so these estimates are less reliable than the single-equation model approach.
Also popular is the use of “reverse regression”, introduced by Conway and Roberts
as a complement to regular regression.78 In ordinary regression, we assess whether the
outcome, compensation for example, is the same for otherwise similar female and male
faculty in terms of qualifications. The goal of reverse regression is to assess whether
qualifications differ among equally paid female and male faculty.79,80 An example
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of this technique is when logistic regression is used to predict a faculty member’s
gender in terms of demographics and academic rewards.81 Reverse regression might
yield very different qualitative results when compared to regular regression, and it
has been criticized as not yielding unbiased estimates of gender partiality.82
Several issues related to the selection of predictors and construction of the regres-
sion model apply to gender equity models. The issues of multicollinearity, inclusion
of irrelevant variables, omission of relevant variables, incorrect specification of the
functional relation between the response and the predictor, outliers and influential
observations, non-normal distribution of residuals, non-constant variance and corre-
lated errors should all be assessed through diagnostic tools and addressed to get a
well-specified model. There are two issues, however, that are of particular impor-
tance when conducting gender equity analysis: the inclusion of covariates potentially
affected by gender (e.g. academic rank) and the inclusion of unobservable constructs,
specifically, faculty productivity. We will discuss these issues in section 2.2.
2.1.4 Decomposition techniques
Decomposition techniques are based on the multiple-equation regression approach2.
After fitting separate regression models for female and male faculty members, the
observed differences between the two are further decomposed into components by
comparison to a gender-neutral scenario: one component attributable to differences
2Examples of studies using these techniques can be seen in Buzan and Hunt (1976), Barbezat
(1987), Haberfeld and Shenhav (1990), and Ashram (1996).
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between female and male faculty in terms of covariates (education, experience, pro-
ductivity, among others), and one or more components of unexplained differences,
which are commonly used as a measure of discrimination. This approach was intro-
duced simultaneously in 1973 by Oaxaca and Blinder to assess gender-based discrim-
ination in salaries84–87 and later extended to logit and probit models.88,89
Two-equation models assume that gender partiality manifests as either female or
male faculty being under or overcompensated, but not both at the same time.75 The
decomposition is achieved by assuming the gender-neutral structure corresponds to
one of the genders.84 By comparing the results of the models using the female and
male structures we can get an interval for the estimated “discrimination” coefficient.
Three-equation models allow for gender partiality to manifest as both overcompen-
sation for men and under compensation for women, at the same time.90 In this regard,
Neumark suggested the use of the coefficients of a pooled model (excluding gender)
as the gender-neutral structure, while Cotton (1988) suggested using the weighted
average of the male and female coefficients to get the gender-neutral structure.91
2.1.5 Structural equation models (SEM)
These techniques are used to asses complex relationships between the academic
reward and representation outcomes and faculty characteristics, by positing direction-
ality and, potentially, temporality between multiple outcomes and covariates. They
also allow for the incorporation of latent variables (such as true productivity), by
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hypothesizing causal pathways between measured and latent covariates.
Unlike multivariable regression, which usually focuses on a single outcome, SEMs
allow the assessment of the interdependence among multiple outcomes, and to inves-
tigate both direct and indirect effects of measured covariates and latent constructs
using a system of equations. Furthermore, while traditional regression techniques
assume no measurement error, structural equation modeling can accommodate im-
perfect measures.
These characteristics make SEMs particularly suited to analyze gender equity in
academia, since rank and salary are closely related. For example, faculty in higher
ranks tend to have higher salaries and promotions are usually accompanied by a
boost in compensation. Rank can also be potentially affected by salary, in that a
faculty member that deserves a pay raise might get promoted to allow for the raise
if the university salary policies include salary ceilings by rank. Departures from the
institution might be based on salary and promotion decisions. And all of these aspects
might be affected by gender.
Although these techniques have been used to assess the gender wage gap in the la-
bor market, there are few applications specific to academia. Smart (1991) used “causal
modeling” to assess direct and indirect gender influences on promotions and salary.97
Fisher, Motowildo and Werner (1993) used correlation and path analysis to look for
evidence of whether gender is a determining factor of academic rank and salary.98
More recently, the University of California at Davis (2013) used structural equation
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modeling to identify “specific processes and historical trends that have the greatest
influence on salary disparities, and thus are potential targets for policy modification”,
gender being one of the variables in their study.99
Other techniques such as the Salary Kit method,100 discriminant analysis,60,101
classification models,102 and biplots103 have also been used, but they are not as pop-
ular as single- or multiple-equation regression models or decomposition techniques.
2.2 Selection of predictors
The choice of variables to include in any model should be grounded in the con-
ceptual framework for the process being studied. In general, gender equity studies in
academia include approximately the same concepts (even if sometimes operationalized
differently) of human capital, structural and market considerations.6 This, evidently,
depends on the data available for each particular study. Some of the most frequently
used covariates are:
• Education: highest degree earned, institution of degree, academic field.
• Experience: time since degree, years at the institution, years in rank, age.
• Performance: number of publications, publication journal impact, books, num-
ber of citations, number and amount of grants, student and peer evaluations,
dissertations supervised, hours spent on teaching and research.
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• Service: service on administrative committees, leadership positions.
• Institution: type, size, location, prestige, unionization, discipline.
• Labor market: average national salary, unemployment rates, number of gradu-
ates in the field.
There are two particularly controversial points regarding the selection of predic-
tors in gender equity analyses: the inclusion covariates potentially affected by gender
(e.g. academic rank) and the inclusion of unobservable constructs (e.g. faculty pro-
ductivity).
2.2.1 Covariates affected by gender partiality
Many of the covariates usually used to assess differences in faculty rewards and
representation in academia might be affected by gender partiality. This is the case
of productivity measures,104 merit-based variables and academic rank. Unfriendly
work environments, lack of mentorship, bias in awarding academic honors, are means
by which gender partiality influences “productivity”. Including such variables in a
model will lead to underestimating the differences between female and male faculty,
because such analyses assume that men and women have had the same opportunity
to “acquire the attributes” that affect the academic reward outcomes.6,93
However, failing to include all relevant covariates in the model will also lead to
biases due to omitted variables. Rank, for example, has been shown to be one of the
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most important predictors of salary,25,105 as initial salary is based on rank and pro-
motions are accompanied by salary increases. For example, Boudreau (1997) showed,
using both hypothetical and actual data free of gender bias, that failing to include
rank in the model produces results that indicate the presence of gender bias.106
Two commonly used approaches are to model the covariates potentially affected
by gender first, and only include them in the model for the outcome of interest if
there is no evidence of gender bias,59,61,98,104,107 or to run separate models with and
without including these covariates and presenting results for both.37,60,108,109
2.2.2 Unobservable constructs
The main example of an unobservable construct in gender equity studies in academia
is faculty productivity, and the issue with such variables is that they can only be
imperfectly measured through observable indicators such as number of publications
or citations.110 Furthermore, the observable indicators might represent measures of
quantity (and not quality) of work.111
Given this issue, some authors choose to exclude productivity measures from their
models,104 sometimes citing that men and women are equally productive112,113 so this
construct, if measured without error, would not confound the relationship between
academic rewards and gender. However, we can only observe if gender is related to
observed measures of productivity and, if gender is related to true productivity, failing
to include it in the model will cause bias due to omission of a relevant variable.
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2.3 Gender equity at University X: adjusted
analyses
2.3.1 Hiring
University X does not record faculty applicant characteristics, so assessing gender
equity in the hiring process is not possible. However, we can compare characteristics
of the male and female faculty at the time of hire.
Using a logistic regression model for gender (female vs. male), we find that
newly hired older faculty members and PhD holders are less likely to be female,
with OR=0.95 (95% CI=[0.93,0.97]) for age and OR=0.60 (95% CI=[0.41,0.88]) for
PhD vs. MD, respectively, after adjusting for year, rank and department of hiring.
2.3.2 Initial rank
Initial rank was studied using an adjacent category logit model with non-proportional
odds for gender, adjusting for degree, age of hire (quadratic function), and depart-
ment3(Table 2.1).
Newly hired female faculty have 42.0% lower odds of holding an initial rank of
Associate Professor compared to Assistant Professor, but 3 times the odds of being
hired as a Full Professor compared to Associate when comparing to male faculty.
3As measures of education, experience and field
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Pooled Female Male
β̂∗ 95% CI β̂∗ 95% CI β̂∗ 95% CI
Female
Full vs Associate 1.16 (0.36,1.96)
Associate vs Assistant -0.54 (-1.05,-0.03)
Degree a
MD-PhD 0.20 (-0.20,0.60) -0.14 (-0.90,0.62) 0.39 (-0.11,0.89)
PhD -0.02 (-0.38,0.34) -0.30 (-0.9,0.30) 0.19 (-0.28,0.67)
Other 0.49 (0.12,0.87) 0.65 (0.15,1.15) 0.34 (-0.24,0.91)
Age at hire b
Linear -0.014 (-0.04,0.02) -0.034 (-0.09,0.02) -0.003 (-0.04,0.03)
Quadratic 0.002 (0.000,0.003) 0.003 (-0.002,0.008) 0.001 (-0.003,0.006)
∗ β̂ represents difference in log odds of being hired at a higher rank comparing to the reference category
a Reference category is MD degree
b Centered at mean
Table 2.1: Log odds of being hired at a higher rank: model coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (CI). Adjacent
category logit model with non-proportional odds for gender. Negative coefficients indicate lower log odds of holding a
higher rank (Full vs Associate or Associate vs Assistant).
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2.3.3 Initial salary
Initial salaries were assessed using a heteroskedastic mixed effects model for log
FTE salary with a random intercept at department level and different residual vari-
ances by department.
Initial salaries are 6.0% lower for females than otherwise similar males (Table 2.2).
Initial salary is lower for MD-PhDs and other degrees compared to MDs, and lower
for Associate and Assistant Professors compared to Full Professors. Adjusting for
rank has no effect on the gender coefficient.
The effect of degree and rank on initial salary is significantly different for female
and male faculty (p<0.001). Female MD-PhD holders have initial salaries that are
20.5% lower than female MDs, while male MD-PhD holders make 12.2% less than male
MDs. Differences in initial salary by rank are more accentuated among male faculty,
for whom an Associate professorship implies a 28.1% lower salary compared to Full
Professor, instead of the 21.3% lower salary comparing female Associate Professors to
female Full Professors. The same holds when comparing Assistant and Full professors,
with females having a 40.5% lower salary compared to 47.8% lower for males.
2.3.4 Promotions
Promotions were studied using ungrouped Poisson regression, i.e., log-linear mod-
els for being promoted which use single units of faculty-time.114 These models yield
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Pooled Female Male
β̂∗ 95% CI β̂∗ 95% CI β̂∗ 95% CI
Female -0.06 (-0.09,-0.04)
Degree a
MD-PhD -0.17 (-0.20,-0.13) -0.23 (-0.29,-0.17) -0.13 (-0.18,-0.09)
PhD -0.43 (-0.46,-0.40) -0.38 (-0.42,-0.34) -0.48 (-0.52,-0.44)
Other -0.12 (-0.16,-0.08) -0.15 (-0.21,-0.09) -0.1 (-0.15,-0.05)
Year b 0.03 (0.02,0.03) 0.03 (0.02,0.03) 0.03 (0.02,0.04)
Rank c
Associate -0.27 (-0.34,-0.19) -0.24 (-0.34,-0.13) -0.33 (-0.43,-0.23)
Assistant -0.58 (-0.65,-0.52) -0.52 (-0.60,-0.44) -0.65 (-0.74,-0.56)
∗ β̂ corresponds to mean difference in log initial salary comparing to the reference
category
a Reference category is MD degree
b Centered at 2005
c Reference category is Full Professor
Table 2.2: Log FTE initial salary: model coefficients and 95% confidence intervals
(CI). Heteroskedastic mixed effects model for log FTE salary (random intercept at
department level and different residual variances by department) fit with REML.
Negative coefficients indicate relative lower geometric mean of initial salary.
results equivalent to proportional hazards regression. There are not enough promo-
tions to run separate regressions by gender.
The hazard of promotion to Associate Professor is 18.1% lower for female com-
pared to otherwise similar male faculty, but there are no gender differences in the
hazard of promotion to Full Professor (Table 2.3). Older faculty are less likely to be
promoted. MD-PhD and PhD holders are more likely than MDs to be promoted to
Associate Professors, while only MD-PhDs are more likely than MDs to be promoted
to Full Professors. The hazard of promotion increases with time in rank up to 9.5
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years for Assistant professors and 10.9 years for Associate Professors, after which the
hazard of being promoted declines over time.
Assistant to Associate Associate to Full
β̂∗ 95% CI β̂∗ 95% CI
Female -0.20 (-0.42,0.02) -0.18 (-0.54,0.17)
Time in rank a
Linear 0.34 (0.29,0.39) 0.43 (0.34,0.53)
Quadratic -0.05 (-0.06,-0.04) -0.04 (-0.06,-0.03)
Degree b
MD-PhD 0.55 (0.25,0.83) 0.96 (0.52,1.39)
PhD 0.33 (0.06,0.59) 0.55 (0.12,0.96)
Other -0.01 (-0.54,0.46) 0.40 (-0.34,1.02)
Age c -0.02 (-0.04,0.00) -0.11 (-0.15,-0.07)
∗ β̂ corresponds to the difference in log hazard of promotion comparing to the
reference category
a Centered at 6 years
b Reference category is MD
c Centered at mean
Table 2.3: Hazard of promotion: model coefficients and 95% confidence intervals
(CI) for Poisson promotion models. Negative coefficients denote lower hazard of being
promoted. Models are specific to a particular rank.
2.3.5 Annual salary adjustments
Annual salary adjustments were modeled using the log of the change in salary
comparing the current salary to the previous year salary as the outcome in a mixed
effects regression model with random intercepts for faculty and department, to ac-
count for clustering of faculty in department and correlation in changes in salary
within a faculty member over time.
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Pooled Female Male
β̂∗ 95% CI β̂∗ 95% CI β̂∗ 95% CI
Female 0.002 (0.001,0.003)
Time in rank a -0.007 (-0.008,-0.006) -0.007 (-0.009,-0.005) -0.007 (-0.008,-0.006)
Rank and Promotion b
Associate not promoted 0.0004 (-0.0009,0.0017) -0.0004 (-0.0027,0.0018) 0.001 (-0.0007,0.0027)
Associate just promoted 0.097 (0.094,0.100) 0.094 (0.089,0.099) 0.099 (0.096,0.103)
Full not promoted 0.004 (0.002,0.005) 0.002 (-0.001,0.005) 0.005 (0.003,0.007)
Full just promoted 0.076 (0.071,0.081) 0.059 (0.050,0.068) 0.084 (0.078,0.090)
Previous salary c -0.016 (-0.018,-0.015) -0.016 (-0.019,-0.013) -0.017 (-0.019,-0.015)
Year d
Linear -0.005 (-0.005,-0.004) -0.005 (-0.005,-0.004) -0.005 (-0.005,-0.004)
Spline (knot=10 years) 0.003 (0.002,0.004) 0.003 (0.002,0.004) 0.003 (0.002,0.004)
∗ β̂ corresponds to the difference in mean log relative change in salary compared to the reference category
a Centered at 6 years, coefficient indicates changes per 10 years in rank
b Reference category is Assistant not promoted
c Centered at mean
d Centered at 2005
Table 2.4: Annual salary adjustment : model coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for mixed effects regression
model for relative change in log FTE salary: log
FTE salary(t)
FTE salary(t− 1)
, with random intercepts at person and department
level. Negative coefficients indicate a relative decrease in FTE salary.
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Annual increases in salary are 0.2% higher for females than for their male coun-
terparts, after adjusting for time in rank, rank and promotion, previous salary, and
calendar year (Table 2.4). Larger annual increases in salary are associated with pro-
motions, while longer time in rank and higher previous salary are associated with
smaller changes in salary. Annual increases in salary have been decreasing from 2005
to 2010, but remain roughly constant from 2010 to 2013.
Female faculty get smaller annual increases in salary than their male counterparts.
Looking at faculty at Full Professor rank, promoted female faculty receive a salary
adjustment that is 5.7% higher than females not promoted. However, promoted males
receive a 7.9% higher salary adjustment than males not promoted. Female faculty
recently promoted to Full Professor then receive a 2.2% significantly lower adjustment
than males just promoted to Full Professor (p<0.001). There are no differences in
the salary adjustments when a faculty is promoted to Associate Professor comparing
female and male faculty.
2.3.6 Departure model
Using using ungrouped Poisson regression, we found that the hazard of departure
from University X is not associated with gender. Full Professors are more more likely
to leave University X than both Assistant and Associate professors, as are faculty with
negative changes in salary with respect to the previous year. Faculty with higher log












Log FTE salary c -0.03 (-0.33,0.26)
Time in rank d 0.03 (0.01,0.04)
∗ β̂ corresponds to differences in log hazard with reference category
a Reference for Change in salary is Assistant not promoted
b Reference category for Rank is Full professor
c Time in rank centered at 6 years
d Log FTE salary centered at mean
Table 2.5: Hazard of departure: model coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (CI)
for Poisson regression model. Negative coefficients denote lower hazard of departure.
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Chapter 3
Estimating higher-level causal effects
in complex systems
The study of causal effects is ubiquitous in the research literature. The Rubin
Causal Model12,119,120 has provided a structured way of estimating causal effects based
on the potential outcomes framework.
Suppose we are interested in the causal effect of a binary exposure Z on an outcome
Y for a target population. We define the individual causal effect for unit i as the
comparison of the potential outcomes Yi(Z = 1) versus Yi(Z = 0), i.e, the outcome
unit i would have, had it been exposed to Z, versus the outcome unit i would have,
had it not been exposed to Z. In the case of gender equity in academia, the exposure
is “gender partiality”. An example of a causal effect would be the comparison of the
salary faculty member i would have had at Institution X, had Institution X been
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gender partial (Yi(Z = 1)) versus the salary faculty member i would have had, had
Institution X been gender neutral (Yi(Z = 0)).
We are generally interested in the average1 of the individual causal effects for the
target population2. The average treatment effect (ATE) and the causal risk ratio
are examples of such causal effects. In practice, only one of the individual potential
outcomes is observed, so individual causal effects cannot be directly calculated. Pop-
ulation causal effects, on the other hand, can be estimated but require assumptions
to be made about the potential outcomes.120
The vast majority of causal inference research focuses on the individual as the
level of analysis. There are situations however in which the outcome of interest is
measured at a higher level, as a function of a cluster of units, and where all units
in the cluster are either exposed or unexposed to Z. An example of this would be
to assess the causal effect of gender partiality on the total amount in dollars paid in
salary for a given department within a university. Departmental policies can be either
gender partial or gender neutral. In this case, the unit of analysis is the department.
With some required assumptions,120 we can estimate the effect of gender partiality
by comparing the outcomes of the gender partial departments to the outcomes of
the gender-neutral departments. It is likely, however, that gender partial policies at
the university level permeate departmental policies, and so we would be interested to
assess the effect of gender partiality at the university level.
1Or any other aggregating function appropriate to the nature of the outcome
2This is what Hernan calls “aggregated” or “population” causal effects.11
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We consider the case where the level of measurement is the collective of all units,
e.g., the university as the collective of all its faculty members. We are interested in
quantifying the causal effect of gender partiality, a university-level phenomena, on
outcomes also defined at the university-level, such as the total amount in dollars paid
to faculty over a period of time. Since we are interested in assessing gender equity for
one particular university, this is akin to estimating an individual causal effect. As
stated above, it cannot be directly measured since only one of the potential outcomes
is observed, that is, the university is either gender partial or gender neutral.
In this chapter, we combine the faculty-level models that describe the hiring, initial
rank, initial salary, promotion, annual salary adjustment and departure models with
a university-level, i.e., an aggregate-level, definition of causal effect. We propose a
simulation-based method to generate university-level estimates for a gender neutral
world and contrast these to the observed aggregate results in the actual world with
some level of gender partiality. The method is based on the fact that the university-
level outcomes are functions of individual-level measurements, where we do have
replication. Therefore, we can simulate realizations of faculty members’ careers over
time and aggregate them to get a university-level measure of gender partiality.
Note, the availability of information at the individual level is crucial to the appli-
cation of this method, since the aggregated causal effect at the university level could
not be calculated if the only information available is in aggregated form.
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3.1 Challenges in estimating institution-level
effects
The methods outlined in section 2.1 provide an array of options to assess gender
equity in academic rewards at individual level, i.e., when the unit of analysis is the
faculty member. These methods provide options to study outcomes individually or
as part of a complex system, the ability to account for the correlation in longitudinal
measurements, and, under certain assumptions, the ability to assess causal effects.
However, regardless of the advantages of the methods presented, the analysis of
the higher-level causal effects for an aggregated unit such as the institution as a
whole presents additional challenges related to the availability of information at the
institutional level.
There are two situations in which we might be interested in assessing gender
partiality at the institutional level, each with very different purposes.
The first case is multi-institution studies, in which the goal is to estimate the
average effect of gender partiality for a geographical region in a period of time. Such
studies ask questions like: are gender neutral institutions considered more presti-
gious; how much more do they invest in their faculty members, when compared to
gender partial institutions? This type of study, although not without methodological
complications, can be handled with the techniques presented in section 2.1.
The main issue with such studies is that they require knowledge of the gender
41
bias, i.e., whether the institution is gender partial or gender neutral, a priori. If we
had such information, we could use the gender partiality status as a binary variable
in, for example, a regression model for university-level outcomes on gender partiality
and characteristics of the institution. However, classifying institutions as gender-
neutral or gender-partial is not trivial. Institutional dynamics are complex and gender
partiality might be present at different points of a person’s academic career. Real-life
gender-neutral institutions might not exist. Using the gender equity perception the
institution has of itself might prove to be an inaccurate (perhaps optimistic) portrayal
of the actual situation. Trying to assign gender partiality roles to institutions is not
only infeasible for a long period of time, but highly unethical.
The second case corresponds to single-institution studies in which we wish to
assess the gender equity situation of the institution on its own. In this particular
case, the methods presented in section 2.1 are insufficient to assess gender equity.
What we would like to do, is to compare the observed institution to itself in a gender
neutral scenario. This would allow us to assess whether the observed institution-level
outcomes are consistent with gender-neutrality.
The problem with this type of study is that, although we have information for
individual faculty members and institution dynamics, we have only one observation
for the institution-level outcomes (a sample size of 1), so we only have information for
the observed scenario and no information for the institution under the gender neutral
scenario, reducing this problem to the estimation of an individual institution-level
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causal effect, which cannot be directly calculated.
The rest of this chapter will focus on setting up the causal framework for single-
institution studies (section 3.2) to later present a method to estimate and conduct
inference for such effects (sections 3.3 and 3.4).
3.2 Causal inference framework
Consider the unit of analysis to be an academic institution U composed of f =
1, ..., F faculty members over a period of time t = 1, ..., T , and let Z represent the
gender partiality status of U , where Z = 1 corresponds to an observed (potentially
gender-partial) scenario and Z = 0 to a gender-neutral scenario.
Based on the individual information on employment status (Hft), salary (Sft)
and academic rank (Rft) for faculty member f at time t, we define the following
representation and academic rewards outcomes of interest at the university-level Y =
(HD, TR1, TR2, TS):
• Hazard of departure of faculty members from the institution, HD, at time tk:
HR(tk) =
∑Ftk




f=1 I(Hftk = 0)/Ftk
]
where Ftk corresponds to the number of faculty members at the institution at
time tk.
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• Total “higher rank” years, i.e, total time faculty members spend at Associate or
Full Professor level (as opposed to Assistant level) over the period of time T ,













where the function I takes values 0 or 1 depending on whether the condition
Rft = “rank” holds, i.e., if faculty member f at time t holds the position “rank”.
• Total compensation in dollars awarded to faculty members over the period of







We are then interested in estimating the “individual” institution’s causal effect
of gender partiality on the outcomes defined above. This entails constructing a
comparison of the potential outcomes Y (Z = 1) and Y (Z = 0), appropriate to
the nature of Y . For the outcomes defined above, these causal effects are given by






the hazard ratio of departure from the university comparing the observed to the
gender-neutral scenario, assuming proportional hazards over time.
• TRL1 =
TR1(Z = 1)− TR1(Z = 0)
Total person years
• TRL2 =
TR2(Z = 1)− TR2(Z = 0)
Total person years
the rates of time in higher rank lost at Full and Associate level, TRL1 and
TRL2 respectively, defined for the common period of observations of the faculty
member f under the observed and gender-neutral scenario,
• RTS =
TS(Z = 0)− TS(Z = 1)
TS(Z = 1)
the relative total compensation, defined for the common period of observations
of the faculty member f under the observed and gender-neutral scenario.
3.3 Simulation-based method of estimation
We will follow the next multi-step approach to estimate the institution-level causal
effects defined above:
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1. Develop a set of nested models for the observed system behavior.
2. Estimate the nested models from the observed data representing the gender
partial experience.
3. Develop a model for the gender neutral counterfactual system.
4. Simulate K iterations of the system and its counterfactual.
5. Calculate the average causal effects across iterations.
3.3.1 Develop a set of nested models for the observed
system behavior
University U is a complex system in terms of its faculty members careers (see
section 1), each one of them defined as a set of transitions from hiring to departure
through the hierarchical academic ranks. This system is represented by the following
set of nested models (Figure 3.1):
1. the Arrival Model represents the joint initial salary (S0), initial rank (R0) and
hired status (H0) as a function of gender (G) and the history of characteristics
of the faculty member (
˜
X0) (human capital and other variables) up to being
hired. Using the standard decomposition of a joint distribution into conditional
distributions, this model (for the fth faculty member) can be written as:
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[Sf0, Rf0, Hf0 = 1 |
˜
Xf0, Gf ] = [Sf0 | Rf0, Hf0 = 1,
˜
Xf0, Gf ]
[Rf0 | Hf0 = 1 |
˜
Xf0, Gf ]
[Hf0 = 1 |
˜
Xf0, Gf ]
Note that information on the last term of the decomposition, corresponding to
the probability of being hired given the candidate’s characteristics and gender
might not be available as a part of administrative records of University U . This
information needs to be derived from the hiring process.
2. the Longitudinal Model depicts joint salary, rank and hired status over dis-





RT ) and employment status (
˜
HT ) as a function of initial salary, initial





WT ) and gender of the faculty member. This can be written as
a transition model in which we assume that the correlation between repeated
measurements of the vector of (salary, rank, employment status) exists because
past values of the vector influence its current probability distribution.121 Then,





























































Conditioning on the history of the faculty members’ characteristics, productivity
and gender, this model further specifies that:
• current salary depends on salary history up to the previous time point, as
well as current rank and employment status,
• current rank depends not only on rank history up to the previous time
point and employment status, but it might also depend on salary history,
• employment status, that is, the decision or imposition to leave the insti-
tution, depends on the history of salary and rank up to the previous time
point given the person was still employed then.
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Wt, G]: rank-specific models for promotion to







)∣∣∣∣˜St−1, ˜Rt, ˜Ht = 1, ˜Xt, ˜Wt, G
]
: model for log change in salary with
respect to the previous year, fit to the entire dataset excluding newly hired
faculty members.










Wt, G]: departure model, fit to the entire dataset.
Different models can be estimated for departure at the end of first year and
departures any time after that, since these departure processes might depend
on different covariates.
Models should include all relevant covariates and all gender main effects and in-
teractions thought to potentially operate at the institution. Salary models should
include random intercepts for any clustering structures present at the university (de-
partments, for example) and take into account correlation over time.
The type and specific functional forms will depend on the particular mechanisms
in place, available data, and model diagnostics. Reasonable models include logistic
regression for hiring, adjacent category logit models for initial rank, and log-link
logistic regressions for promotions and departures.
This step will produce a vector of estimated coefficients θ̂1 for all relevant variables
included in the career models for the observed, potentially gender-partial scenario.
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This step then produces a vector of estimated coefficients θ̂0, for all relevant vari-
ables included in the career models, under the chosen gender-neutral scenario.
The choice of the appropriate gender-neutral form depends on the particulars of
each institution. The choices are the same ones confronted by the decomposition
techniques presented in section 2.1.4. Then, θ̂0 can take any of the following struc-
tures:
1. Female: set θ̂0 to the coefficients of the career models fit for female faculty only.
This assumes male faculty are overpaid in the observed scenario.
2. Male: set θ̂0 to the coefficients of the career models fit for male faculty only.
This assumes female faculty are underpaid in the observed scenario.
3. Pooled: set θ̂0 to the coefficients of the career models fit for all faculty members,
excluding gender from the models. This assumes male faculty are overpaid and
female faculty are underpaid at the same time in the observed scenario, and the
coefficients for the gender- neutral scenario are derived by ignoring gender.
4. Weighted: set θ̂0 to the coefficients of the career models fit for all faculty mem-
bers, with the gender coefficients changed to zero. This assumes male faculty
are overpaid and female faculty are underpaid at the same time in the observed
scenario, and the coefficients for the gender-neutral scenario are adjusted for
gender.
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3.3.4 Simulate K realizations of the system and its
counterfactual
Once both system and counterfactual parameters have been estimated (θ̂1,θ̂0),
we will use this information to generate K realizations of each faculty member’s
career under the observed and gender-neutral scenario (Careerfk(θ̂1),Careerfk(θ̂0)),
following the models outlined in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.3.
Depending on the behavior chosen for the counterfactual, gender neutrality will
have an effect on both male and female faculty members (female, male or pooled
structure), or female faculty members only (weighted structure). We can then choose
to run the simulation on all faculty members or female faculty members only. In cases
where both females and males are included, results will be given separately for each.
A single iteration k of this simulation will follow the steps shown in Figure 3.3.
Each step is run twice with parameters θ̂1 and θ̂0 separately, to generate realizations
of the observed and gender-neutral scenario:
1. If information for the pool of applicants to an academic position is available,
generate hiring decisions as random Bernoulli draws with probability pH esti-
mated using the hiring model.
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For newly hired faculty:
2. Generate initial rank:
If positions at the university are advertised as open rank, and rank is assigned to
the new faculty member as a function of human capital variables, generate initial
rank as a random draw from the ranks Assistant, Associate or Full professor,
with probabilities (pR1,pR2,pR3) estimated using the initial rank model.
If the university hires faculty members for specific ranks, use observed initial
ranks.
3. Generate initial salaries:
Initial log salaries are generated from the initial log salary model, and need
to be transformed back to their original scale. Assuming the log-transformed
initial salaries are Gaussian with variance σ2, we could estimate the mean initial
salary as exp( ̂log(S0)+ σ̂
2/2). However, the lognormality and constant variance
assumptions are very strong and rarely hold. Instead, we propose a method
based on Duan’s smearing estimator to produce a non-parametric estimation of
the initial salaries.122
Assuming a mixed effects model with a random intercept at department level
and different residual variances by department, then:
(a) Get the predicted mean log initial salary from the initial salary model,
including the department random effects:
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̂log(S0) + d̂i where d ∼ N(0, τ
2), i = 1, ..., D
where D represents the number of departments.
(b) Add noise at faculty member level ε̂if .
ε̂if is selected at random from the distribution of standardized female resid-
uals (for the observed scenario) or the distribution of standardized male
residuals (for the gender-neutral scenario), on the log scale, from the initial
salary model, and unstandardized to the department of faculty member f .
̂log(S0) + d̂i + ε̂if








where Fi0 is the number of newly hired female (observed scenario) or male
(gender-neutral scenario) faculty members at department i.
For both new and existing faculty:
4. Generate initial departure decisions:
If there are enough departures at the end of the first year in the dataset so that
a separate departure model was estimated for the initial departure, or if there is
sufficient information in the dataset to predict initial departures using a general
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departure model, generate initial departures as a random draw from a Bernoulli
distribution with probability pD, estimated from the departure model.
If there are not enough departures at the end of the first year, assume no faculty
member leaves the institution at this time.
Then, conditional on staying at the institution:
5. Generate promotion decisions as random Bernoulli draws with probabilities
(pAssoc ,pFull), estimated from the rank-specific promotion models.
6. If the faculty member is promoted, assign next academic rank, otherwise he/she
remains in current rank.
7. Generate new salary following the smearing-based procedure outlined above:
(a) Get the predicted mean log change in salary from the change in salary
(saldt) model, including any random effects if present.
Assuming a mixed effects model with time nested in faculty members, and
faculty members nested in departments:
ŝaldtft + d̂i + d̂if
where di ∼ N(0, τ
2
1 ) and dif ∼ N(0, τ2)
2 correspond to the department and
person random effects respectively.
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(b) Add noise at time/faculty member level ε̂ift
ε̂ift is selected at random from the distribution of standardized female
residuals (for the observed scenario) or the distribution of standardized
male residuals (for the gender-neutral scenario),on the log scale, from the
change in salary model, and unstandardized to the department of faculty
member f .
ŝaldtft + d̂i + d̂if + ε̂ift
(c) Generate new log salary as:
̂log(Sft) = ŝaldtft + d̂i + d̂if + ε̂ift + ̂log(Sf,t−1)








where Fi is the number of female (observed scenario) or male (gender-
neutral scenario) faculty members at department i.
8. Generate departure decisions as random Bernoulli draws with probability pif ,
estimated from the departure model.
9. Repeat steps 5-8 a total of T − 1 times, for a simulation time period of length
T .
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3.3.5 Estimate average causal effects
After the simulation above is done, we will have K realizations of the institution
under the observed and gender-neutral scenarios. We can then use the individual
faculty member’s information to calculate institution-level causal effects for each re-





TR1k(Z = 1)− TR1k(Z = 0)
Total person years
• TRL2k =
TR2k(Z = 1)− TR2k(Z = 0)
Total person years
where TRL1k and TRL2k are defined for the common period of observations of
the faculty member f under the observed and gender-neutral scenario,
• RTSk =
TSk(Z = 0)− TSk(Z = 1)
TSk(Z = 1)
,
defined for the common period of observations of the faculty member f under
the observed and gender-neutral scenario.
Finally, the average causal effects (CE) are given by:


























3.4 Inference for estimated higher-order causal
effects
We have defined and demonstrated the estimation of the point estimates of the
causal effect of gender-partiality on the institution. This section addresses variance
and confidence interval estimation.
Since the variance of the average causal effects has no closed form solution, we
will use resampling procedures to calculate it. We use the case bootstrap procedure
where individual faculty members are resampled conditional on gender and depart-
ment structure, in order to maintain the distribution of these characteristics in each
bootstrap sample.
We will then run the simulation-based method to estimate the average causal
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effects on each of a total of B bootstrap samples (e.g. 250 samples). This implies re-
fitting the nested career models, simulating the system and its counterfactual K times
and estimating HRD, TRL1, TRL2 and RTS as averages across the K realizations
of the institution, for each bootstrap sample.
This process is computationally intensive, since it entails refitting the nested career
models and simulating academic careers a total of 2KB times: 2 scenarios (observed
and gender-neutral), K realizations, B bootstrap samples. We introduce then the
following statistical and computational approaches to reduce computational time:
1. Use of one-step estimators when refitting the career models during bootstrap.
In this approach, proposed by Moulton and Zeger (1991), we supply the algo-
rithm with the model coefficients estimated for the original dataset as initial
values and take one Newton-Raphson iteration in such direction, instead of
refitting the career models to convergence.123
This method not only reduces computation time, but also provides more stable
bootstrap estimators in the case of extreme bootstrap samples.
2. Model the variance of the estimated effect as a function of the inverse number
of realizations.
In theory, we would like to simulate an infinite number of realizations (K → ∞)
of University U under the observed and gender-neutral scenarios, which is, of
course, not feasible. Instead, we can run a reduced number of realizations
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Kr < K and model the variance of the estimated effect as:
E[V ar(CEi)k] = β0 + β1
1
k
Where CEi represents one of the 4 effects of interest HRD, TRL1, TRL2 or
RTS, k = 2, ..., Kr < K and V ar(CEi)k is calculated over k realizations of U .
In this model, β0 can be interpreted as the expected variance of the effect when
1/k is zero, that is, when k → ∞, so we can use β̂0 as an estimator for the
desired variance.
3. From the computational point of view, the use of cloud computing and parallel
programming reduces running time greatly. To further reduce computation
time, the simulation method algorithm combines R and C++ code, through
Rcpp, which resulted in a 75% reduction in running time.
Once variances are estimated, we can estimate confidence intervals for the causal
effects that will let us assess whether the observed institution is significantly different
from its gender neutral counterpart. Intervals that contain 1 (in the case of the
average HRD) and intervals that contain zero (for average TRL and RTS) indicate
no statistically significant departures from gender-neutrality.
Code to implement the simulation-based method and perform the bootstrap vari-




Assessing sources of information in
complex designs
Once institution-level effects have been estimated, and if any departures from
gender neutrality exist, the next step in the analysis is to identify the determinants in
the academic career that most contribute to gender partiality. That is, how do gender
disparities observed in the nested career models affect the estimated institution-level
causal effect? In this chapter we present a regression-based method to identify the
sources of variability of estimated effects in complex designs, as a function of existing
differences within their individual components.
The desire to partition sources of variation within the complex system is one that
arises in several different applications. The methods presented here are motivated by
the gender equity problem but also apply to other complex systems including complex
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study designs, e.g. a stepped wedge design. In a stepped wedge, a researcher may
be interested in the separation of cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence about a
treatment effect. Section 4.1 presents a small digression from the overall theme of this
dissertation to introduce the stepped wedge design and set up the method to assess
the contributions to estimates of a complex intervention effect. Sections 4.1.2 and
4.1.3 present the proposed method and simulation results within the stepped wedge
paradigm. We finish this chapter by extending the proposed method to more complex
systems, and discuss its application in the context of studying gender partiality in
academia 4.2.
4.1 Motivating application : Stepped wedge
designs
Designs where intervention assignment is done at a group level are known as
cluster designs. An example of such a design is the assignment of an intervention to
a whole village, as opposed to assigning the intervention to the individual villagers.
This type of design is frequently used when individual assignment is not feasible,
there is the potential for interference or contamination between individuals, or when
we are interested in assessing a higher-level effect, such as at the village level.
There are several ways in which assignment of intervention can be done at the
cluster level. The stepped wedge design is a special case of the crossover design where
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all the clusters receive control followed by the intervention. However, the duration of
time the clusters are observed during the control and intervention period differs and
this defines the stepped wedge design.124 Specifically, at the beginning of the study
all clusters are assigned a time when they will cross-over to the intervention, such
that by the end of the trial, all the clusters are receiving the intervention.125 Table
4.1 shows an example of a complete stepped design1.
Time
Cluster 1 2 3 4 5
1 0 1 1 1 1
2 0 0 1 1 1
3 0 0 0 1 1
4 0 0 0 0 1
Table 4.1: Example of complete stepped wedge design. At time 1, all clusters
start out in the control arm of the study (0). At subsequent times, clusters start
receiving the intervention (1) until all clusters are exposed (time 5). Measurements
are conducted at each of the 5 time points.
The stepped wedge design is useful in cases where the intervention is difficult to
implement within a large number of clusters simultaneously. However, since more
clusters receive the intervention towards the end of the study, the intervention effect
“might be confounded with underlying temporal trends”.124 It is then important to
assess the effect that cross-sectional and longitudinal information have on the overall
intervention effect.
1Note that there are other possibilities, such as incomplete designs, as discussed in Hemming et
al. (2014). We shall focus here on the complete design.
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4.1.1 Model and contrasts
In cluster designs, it is common that the individual measurements are not inde-
pendent. In order to take this within-cluster correlation into account, we set up the
following mixed model for a Gaussian response yijt of interest measured on individuals
within clusters:
yijt = β0 + b0i + b0ij + (β1 + b1i)Zit + βSXS + εijt (4.1)
Where:
• i denotes cluster, i = 1, ..., N
• j denotes person, j = 1, ..., J
• t denotes time, t = 1, ..., K
• Zit is an intervention indicator: it takes the value 0 if cluster i at time t is in
the control arm, and it takes the value 1 if cluster i at time t is receiving the
intervention
• XS and βS are a matrix and vector respectively of variables and coefficients for
a natural spline of S degrees of freedom on time
• b0i and b0ij correspond to random intercepts at cluster and person level, with
b0i ∼ N(0, σ
2
c ) and b0ij ∼ N(0, σ
2
p)
• b1i corresponds a random slope on the treatment indicator, with b1i ∼ N(0, σ
2
I )





• For a particular cluster i, K0i and K1i denote the number of observations before
and after cluster i was assigned to the intervention, respectively.
• For a particular time t, N0t and N1t denote the number of clusters assigned to
control and intervention, respectively.
We are interested in investigating the contribution of cross-sectional and longi-
tudinal information to the overall estimated intervention effect. That is, we seek to
assess the contributions of two sources of evidence to the final effect estimate: (1)
the differences in mean response between intervention and control at each time point;
and (2) the mean differences after versus before the crossover for each cluster. We
call these the “cross-sectional” and “longitudinal” contrasts, respectively and define
them as follows.
4.1.1.1 Cross-sectional contrasts
For a particular time t, let ȳC0t and ȳC1t be the mean response (at person level)
















The cross-sectional contrasts are given by ȳC1t − ȳC0t with variance:


















For a particular cluster i, let ȳL0i and ȳL1i be the mean response before and after















The longitudinal contrast for cluster i is given by ȳL1i − ȳL0i, with variance:






The behavior of these variances is important to set up simulation parameters that
would allow us to assess which components, cross-sectional or longitudinal, contribute
more to the estimation of the treatment effect. We created a shiny app that allows a






e , K, K0i, K1i, N , N0t, N1t and J on
the magnitude and behavior of the variance of the contrasts. The shiny app can be
accessed at https://francisabreu.shinyapps.io/Variance_of_Contrasts/
Appendix 8.1 provides further comments on the behavior of these variances.
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4.1.2 Method
We are interested in assessing the contribution of the cross-sectional and longi-
tudinal contrasts on the treatment effect β1. We can do this by conditioning the
estimated model coefficients on the cross-sectional and longitudinal contrasts and an-
alyzing the reduction in the variance of β1 and the weight of each individual contrast
on the value of β1.
Let us consider the general form of a linear mixed model in matrix form as
Y = Xβ + Zγ + ε
where Y is the vector of responses, β is the vector of unknown parameters as-
sociated with the fixed effects, X and Z are known matrices and γ and ε are the
unobservable random effects and residuals respectively. We can estimate β as:
β̂ = (X tV −1X)X tV −1Y = MY
where V is the variance-covariance matrix of Y .
Let us consider AY a vector of contrasts. If AY corresponds to cross-sectional
contrasts, it will contain, for each time t, the difference in mean response between
the clusters assigned to the intervention and the clusters assigned to control. If AY
corresponds to longitudinal contrasts, it will contain, for each cluster i, the difference
in mean response between the period of time when cluster i was assigned to the
intervention and the period of time when it was assigned to control.
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Assuming Y follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution Y ∼ MVN(Xβ, V ), the
variance of β̂ is given by V ar(β̂) = MVM t
The conditional distribution of β̂ on AY is then multivariate normal
β̂ | AY ∼ MVN(E[β̂ | AY ], V ar[β̂ | AY ])
with:
E[β̂ | AY ] = β +MVAt(AV At)−1(AY − AXβ) (4.2)
V ar[β̂ | AY ] = MVM t −MVAt(AV At)−1AVM (4.3)
We can then use the coefficients of the contrasts AY in equation 4.2, that is, λ =
MVAt(AV At)−1 to assess the effect of each individual contrast on the treatment
effect, and compare the variances obtained using equation 4.3 to the variance of the
treatment effect V ar(β̂) to assess the percent reduction in variance attributable to
cross-sectional and longitudinal components.
The following section presents a simulation study in which we apply the method
described.
4.1.3 Simulation study
We generated data for a Gaussian response as measured in a stepped wedge design
following model 4.1, for combinations of several values of the parameters J , K, N , β1,
σ2C , σ
2
I . Model intercept was assumed to β0 = −2.5, σ
2
e = 1, the person-level variance
σ2P = σ
2





8.2 lists all values considered for each parameter.
Results below correspond to a scenario with N = 6 clusters, with 10 individuals per
cluster, measured over 12 months. There is a linear temporal trend in the responses
with β1 = −0.5 and σ
2
C = 0.5, with a random slope on the treatment effect. Results
for other scenarios will be made available as a shiny app in the future.
Table 4.2 shows the variance of β̂1, overall and conditioning on cross-sectional
and longitudinal contrasts for models with 5 different degrees of freedom for the
natural spline on time. We can observe that the variance of β̂1 is greatly reduced (∼
99.9%) when conditioning on the longitudinal contrasts implying that, in the design
considered, the overwhelming fraction of information comes from the longitudinal
component of the design.
Conditioning contrast
S Overall Cross-sectional Longitudinal
0 0.0107 0.0105 0.000007
1 0.0242 0.0228 0.000007
2 0.0246 0.0232 0.000007
4 0.0272 0.0255 0.000007
8 0.0274 0.0257 0.000007
Table 4.2: Variance of β̂1: overall and conditioning on cross-sectional and longitudi-
nal contrasts. S corresponds to the degrees of freedom of the natural spline in model
4.1
Figure 4.1 shows the λ coefficients for cross-sectional and longitudinal contrasts,




4.2 Assessing sources of information in com-
plex systems
The method presented in section 4.1.2 can be extended to systems more complex
than the stepped wedge design by using regression models to assess the association
of the overall estimated higher-level causal effect with differences found at each of
its components. In the example of gender equity in academia, this means assessing
the relationship of the estimated institution-level causal effects to gender disparities
found at hiring, initial rank, initial salary, promotions, annual salary adjustments and
departures.
In the Gaussian case and in examples like the stepped wedge design presented
in sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, there are closed forms for the variances and regression
coefficients. For the complex system of academia however, the causal effects of interest
are complex, non-linear functions of parameters for the observed and the gender
neutral scenario θ = (θ1, θ0).
Let CE be the causal effects of interest, then we can express the estimated causal
effects as a complex function of history of salary, rank, and employment under the














The method to assess the sources of information in this case is made easier by
using the power of bootstrapping. For a number B of bootstrap samples (e.g. 250),
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we obtain the estimated causal effects CE
(b)
and the save the gender coefficients of
the career models θ
(b)
1Gj for the observed scenario
2, with j = 1, ..., J representing one of
the career steps (hiring, initial rank, initial salary, promotion to associate, promotion
to full professor, annual salary adjustments, and departures).
We can then regress CE
(b)

















The relative sizes of the γ coefficients and their t-statistics will then inform us
about the components that influence the estimated causal effects the most. We
present results for this method applied to the gender equity example in section 5.4
for simulated data and in Chapter 6 for University X.
2Remember that θ1 is the vector of coefficients of all variables included in the career model for




This chapter presents simulations that assess the performance of the methods
outlined in chapters 3 and 4, under different gender partiality scenarios.
The simulation is conducted in two steps. First, we generate faculty careers within
a hypothetical university with known mechanisms of gender partiality. For each
repetition of the university, we estimate the vector of effects (CE) and study their
distributions, as well as the sources of information that contribute to the higher-level
causal estimators across repetitions of the simulation.
75
5.1 Data generation under known mechanisms
of bias
For a defined time period, we generate a pool of existing faculty members and a
pool of applicants, then simulate the hiring process and academic career of the faculty
members over time. This can be done by formulating a hypothesis on the dynamics
of the institution, with the following elements.
• Size and characteristics of the institution at the start of the simulation period:
Gender, full time equivalent salary, change in salary with respect to previous
year, rank, and time in current rank need to be included as characteristics in
the dataset. Optional characteristics may include department, year of hiring,
age, degree, race, and productivity measures, among others.
• Size and characteristics of the applicant pool for each year of the simulation:
Characteristics to be included should be those thought to determine hiring de-
cisions, for example, desirability measures, department of application, gender,
degree, age, race, among others. These characteristics may reflect market con-
ditions or recruitment strategies of the institution.
• Hiring model: Model for the probability of being hired given applicant’s charac-
teristics. This model should be sensible to the size of the institution. The model
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can be data driven or coefficients can be set according to university policy or
other considerations.
• Career models: Models for initial rank, initial salary, promotions, annual salary
adjustments and departure from the institution, as defined in section 3.3.2. The
gender coefficients of these models is set to reflect a specified level of bias. These
models can be data driven or coefficients can be set according to university
policy or other considerations.
5.1.1 Simulation parameters
We generate 500 datasets under four different gender partiality scenarios: neutral
(GN), low gender partial (LGP), medium gender partial (MGP) and high gender
partial (HGP), further described in page 82. The following parameter values were
used to generate the data:
• Time period: 2005-2014 (10 years).
• Institution size: 1000 faculty members at 2005.
• Existing faculty members:
Distribution of faculty members by gender, race, rank, department and degree
reflect US medical school national faculty distributions1261. Faculty are classi-
1Table 14table18.xlsx for degree, excluding Dentistry, Other Health Professions, Social Sciences,
Veterinary Sciences, All Others, and Public Health.
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fied as recently promoted or not by a random draw from a Bernoulli distribution,
with probabilities of promotion of pF = 0.095 for female faculty and pM = 0.119
for male faculty.
Current age is assumed to have different means by gender, race, department
category (basic or clinical) and rank, following Alexander and Liu.127 Individual
ages are a random draw from a right skew normal distribution with variance=81
and skewness=10, constrained to be between 18 and 90.
Age-at-hire is assumed right skew normal with mean 37.8 years following Alexan-
der and Liu,127 variance=42.25 and skewness=10, constrained to be between 18
and 90. Age-at-hire is also constrained to be smaller than age, and for professors
not newly promoted it is further constrained to be smaller than age-1.2
Time in current rank for assistant professors is generated given age and age-
at-hire. For newly promoted faculty, it is obtained as a random draw from




) while for assistant and full professors not
promoted, times are drawn from exponential distributions, respectively exp(1/6)
and exp(1/9), and constrained to be larger than 1 and smaller than the time
the faculty member has been at the institution.
Salaries (ftesal) are assumed to be lognormal with variance for the logged
salaries of 0.004 and different means by degree, rank and department, following
2Since the person was not promoted, their time in rank has to be greater than 1
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the model:
E[log(ftesal)] = 12.5− 0.05 · female+ 0.25 ·MD + 0.25 · PhD
−0.25 · Associate− 0.5 · Assistant
−0.4 · BasicSciences− 0.4 · FamilyMedicine
−0.4 · InternalMedicine− 0.5 ·Neurology − 0.35 ·ObGyn
−0.35 ·Other − 0.45 · Pathology − 0.50 · Pediatrics
−0.50 · Psychiatry − 0.2 ·Radiology − 0.2 · Surgery
• Applicant pool:
The size of the applicant pool by year is a random draw from a Poisson distri-
bution with mean 5% of the number of medical school graduates.128
The department of application reflects the distribution of active residents by
GME specialty for 2013-2014.129 Gender and race reflect the national distri-
bution of medical graduates130,131 over time, and race and is assumed to be
unrelated to the rest of the covariates. Degrees are assumed to depend on gen-
der and department of application, reflecting existing faculty distribution. Age
is assumed to be right skew normal with mean 38 years,127 variance=64 and
skewness=10.
Furthermore, a “true desirability” variable that represents a measure of abil-
ity, motivation, productivity and other characteristics that make an applicant
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desirable for a faculty job was generated as a standardized skew normal with
skewness=50 assuming no differences between males and females.
• Hiring model:
Hiring is assumed to depend on the desirability of the candidate and possibly
on gender according to four scenarios: gender neutral (GN), low gender partial
(LGP), medium gender partial (MGP) and high gender partial (HGP) (Tables
5.1 and 5.2). A model intercept of -2 was assumed to reflect the log odds of
being hired as a male applicant of average desirability.
• Career models:
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show model specification and gender coefficients under the
four gender partiality scenarios specified.
Salaries are assumed lognormal with standard deviation 0.2 for the logged









Hiring logit P (hiredvt = 1) = β0 + log(2) desirabilityvt + β femalev
Initial rank
logit P (R1f0 = 1|R1 or R2) = −1.5 + 0.25 MDf0 + 0.25 PhDf0 + β femalef
logit P (R2f0 = 1|R2 or R3) = −1.1 + 0.25 MDf0 + 0.2 PhDf0 + β femalef
Initial salary E[log(ftesaldf0)] =
12 + β0d + 0.25 MDdf0 + 0.25 PhDdf0 + 0.03 (yeardf0 − 2005)
−0.25 R2df0 − 0.50 R3df0 + β femaledf
with β0d ∼ N(0, 0.01)
Departure (≤year 1) logit P (departuref0 = 1) = −2.25 + 0.25 R2f0 + 0.50 R3f0 − 0.25LftesalCf0 + β femalef
Promotion logit P (promotedft = 1) = −3 + β femalef








0.025 + βod + 0.10 R2.JPdft + 0.10 R1.JPdft + β femaledf
with β0d ∼ N(0, 0.0025)
Departure (>year 1) logP (departureft = 1) =
−2.25 + 0.25 R2ft + 0.50 R3ft − 0.25 LftesalCft + 0.75 CSNft
+0.10 CS1ft − 0.10 CS2ft − 0.50 CSM2ft + β femalef
v = 1, ..., V , with V : number of applicants for a faculty position in a particular year t.
f = 1, .., Ft, with Ft: number of faculty members in a particular year t.
d = 1, ..., D with D: number of departments at the university.
t = 1, ..., T , with T : number of years in the simulation period and t = 0 corresponds to hiring year
Variables:
Ranks: R1=Full, R2=Associate, R3=Assistant
LftesalCft = log(ftesal)ft centered at Lftesalt
Promotion indicators: R1.JP= Full professor just promoted, R2.JP= Associate professor just promoted
Change in salary: CSN= negative change, CS1= change in (0,1]%, CS2= change in (1,2]%, CSM2= change greater than 2%.
Reference category CS0= no change in salary.
Table 5.1: Data generation under known mechanisms of bias: Hiring and Career models
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Gender partiality scenario
Model Neutral (GN) Low (LGP) Medium (MGP) High (HGP)
Hiring 0 log(0.85) log(0.70) log(0.60)
Initial rank 0 log(0.85) log(0.70) log(0.60)
Initial salary 0 -0.06 -0.12 -0.18
Departure (≤year 1) 0 log(1.10) log(1.20) log(1.30)
Promotion 0 log(0.85) log(0.70) log(0.60)
Change in salary 0 -0.005 -0.01 -0.015
Departure (>year 1) 0 log(1.10) log(1.20) log(1.30)
Table 5.2: Data generation under known mechanisms of bias: Gender coefficients
The parameters specified create complex gender partiality scenarios as follows:
• For the low gender-partial scenario, as compared to otherwise similar male fac-
ulty members, women are: 15% less likely to be hired at all and 15% less likely
to be hired at a higher rank, and promoted. They have 10% higher hazard
of leaving the institution. Their initial salaries and subsequent annual salary
adjustments are 6% and 0.5% lower than men’s, respectively.
• For the medium gender-partial scenario, 30% less likely to be hired, to be hired
at higher rank and to be promoted. They also have 20% higher hazard of
leaving the institution, and their initial salaries and subsequent annual salary
adjustments are 12% and 1% lower than men’s, respectively.
• For the high gender-partial scenario, 40% less likely to be hired, to be hired at
higher rank and to be promoted. They also have 30% higher hazard of leaving
the institution, their initial salaries and subsequent annual salary adjustments
are 18% and 1.5% lower than men’s, respectively.
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5.2 Distribution of estimated causal effects
We generated 500 datasets for each gender partiality scenario. For each dataset,
we used the simulation-based method to estimate the average causal effects HRD,
TRL1, TRL2 and RTS, with the following parameters:
• condition on observed initial ranks,
• no departures at the end of first year at the institution,
• Weighted counterfactual structure, i.e., set the coefficients of the career models
for the gender-neutral scenario (θ̂0) to be the coefficients of the career models
fit for the observed scenario (θ̂1), with the gender coefficients changed to zero.
• K = 100 realizations of the institution.
The weighted counterfactual structure implies that there are no differences for
male faculty between the observed institution and its gender-neutral counterpart.
Therefore, we present results for the collective of female faculty at the institution
over the 10 year period under study.
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the estimated causal effects for 500 datasets
under the four gender partiality scenarios specified (gender neutral, low gender partial,
medium gender partial, high gender partial). Table 5.3 shows the corresponding
causal effects averaged over the 500 simulated datasets, by specified scenario.
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Gender Low gender Medium gender High gender
Effect neutral (GN) partial (LGP) partial (MGP) partial (HGP)
RTS a 0.07% 4.4% 8.1% 11.9%
HRD b 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4
TRL2 c 0.2 -4.0 -6.1 -8.9
TRL1 d -0.1 -3.2 -7.4 -9.1
a Relative Total Salary: % difference in total compensation over 10 years in gender-
neutral versus the observed scenario, relative to the observed scenario
b Hazard Ratio of Departure: ratio of hazard of departure comparing the observed to
the gender neutral scenario
c Time at Associate Professor rank Lost: difference in total time at Associate Professor
rank between the observed and the gender-neutral scenario, relative to total faculty
time
d Time at Full Professor rank Lost: difference in total time at Full Professor rank
between the observed and the gender-neutral scenario, relative to total faculty time
Table 5.3: Average causal effects over 500 simulated datasets by gender partiality
scenario
The gender neutral scenario serves as a control to assess whether the effects are
calculated correctly, since in this case both the observed and counterfactual institu-
tions are gender neutral. We can see that the effects estimated in this case are indeed
very close to the theoretical values that indicate no departure from gender neutrality
(zero for RTS, TRL2 and TRL1, and 1 for HRD).
The rest of the scenarios reflect increasing differences between the institution and
the gender neutral scenario, with increasing gender partiality having a more marked
effect on the HRD and RTS than on the time in higher rank lost.
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The investment made under gender neutrality on female faculty is 4.4%, 8.1%
and 11.9% higher than that made under the low, medium and high gender partiality
scenarios specified. This corresponds to 25.8, 36.9 and 51.6 million dollars on average
not paid over 10 years to female faculty respectively.
The hazard of departure comparing the simulated datasets to their gender neutral
counterparts increases from 10% higher for LGP to 40% higher for HGP.
Time in higher rank lost at Associate and Full Professor levels also increases
for higher gender partial scenarios, with approximately the same time lost at both
levels. For the higher gender-partial scenario for example, female faculty lose 9.1 Full
Professor years per 1000 faculty years, which corresponds on average 23 Full Professor
years lost to over a period 10 years.
5.3 Distribution of estimated variances of es-
timated causal effects
In order to investigate the distribution of the variances of the estimated causal
effects, we ran the simulation-based method on 100 simulated institutions under the
low gender partial scenario, with 100 iterations and 250 bootstrap replications for
each simulated institution. Other scenarios present the same patterns (not shown).
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We estimated the variances of the estimated causal effects in two different ways:
• Method 1: as bootstrap variances of the estimated causal effects calculated over
100 iterations of the simulation-based method.
• Method 2: as modeled variances as discussed in section 3.4, i.e, modeling the
bootstrap variances using 16 iterations of the method only.
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of the 100 variances for the 100 simulated insti-
tution calculated under both methods.
The true variance of the estimated causal effects can be approximated by the
variance of the estimated causal effects across the 100 simulated institutions. This is
shown as red line in Figure 5.2.
On average, we observe that the estimated variances for RTS and HRD are within
2.5% of the approximated true variance. The margin of error is larger of TRL2 and
TRL1, with the estimated variances being approximately 20% higher, which will lead
to conservative confidence intervals.
The modeled variances resemble closely the bootstrap variances, so their use would
lead to very similar results. Note however that the running time for a single dataset
decreases in 85% when using the modeled variances with 16 iterations. This represents
a running time of 10 minutes as compared to approximately 40 minutes to run 250




5.4 Contribution of career steps to estimated
causal effects
We used the regression-based method to assess the sources of information for 100
institutions generated under the low gender partiality scenario, using 100 iterations
and 250 bootstrap samples.
Each bootstrap sample produces an estimated vector of causal effects CE
(b)
and a
vector of gender coefficients θ̂
(b)
1G. For each simulated institution, and using information
from the b = 1, ..., 250 bootstrap samples, we regressed the estimated causal effects on
the estimated gender coefficients to obtain a t-value and a γ coefficient for each of the
career steps. The t-values provide insight as to which career steps contribute more
to the estimated causal effects, while the gamma coefficients will provide information
on the direction of the relationship.
Tables 5.4 through 5.7 show the average t-values and γ coefficients over the 100
simulated institutions, along with 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles, for each of the causal
effects of interest. In this particular example no interactions are significant so only
main effects are shown.
The main contributors to the average Relative total compensation (RTS) are
differences in initial salaries between female and male faculty, followed by disparities
in annual salary adjustments. In both cases, a larger disparity against female faculty.
i.e., lower female initial salaries and annual adjustments with respect to male faculty,
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increases the value of RTS.
The average Hazard ratio of departure (HRD) is mainly determined by differences
in the hazards of departure between female and male faculty, followed by disparities
in annual salary adjustments and hazard of promotion to Associate Professor. Higher
hazards of departure for female faculty, and larger disparities against female faculty in
annual salary adjustments and hazard of promotion to Associate professor, produce
a higher HRD
Average Time in higher rank lost at Associate level (TRL2), is mainly determined
by promotions to Full Professor, followed by promotions to Associate Professor. TRL2
is smaller (more time at Associate Professor level lost) for lower hazards of promotion
of female to Full and Associate Professor.
Average Time in higher rank lost at Full level (TRL1), is mainly determined
by promotions to Associate and Full Professor. A higher TRL1 is associated with
lower hazard of promotion of female faculty to Associate level and higher hazard of
promotion to Full Professor.
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t-values γ
Mean Q2.5% Q97.5% Mean Q2.5% Q97.5%
Initial rank 0.24 -1.79 2.61 0.00 -0.01 0.01
Initial salary -13.69 -17.32 -10.48 -0.54 -0.68 -0.45
Promotion to Associate -1.48 -3.18 0.32 -0.00 -0.01 0.00
Promotion to Full -0.98 -2.84 0.84 -0.00 -0.01 0.00
Annual salary adjustments -3.11 -5.09 -0.89 -2.52 -4.12 -0.68
Departures -0.26 -2.44 1.29 -0.00 -0.02 0.01
Table 5.4: Sources of information of RTS: Average, 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles
(Q2.5% and Q97.5%) for t-values and γ coefficients.
t-values γ
Mean Q2.5% Q97.5% Mean Q2.5% Q97.5%
Initial rank 0.17 -1.86 1.99 0.00 -0.01 0.01
Initial salary 0.70 -1.44 3.28 0.03 -0.08 0.16
Promotion to Associate -4.70 -7.99 -1.63 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
Promotion to Full -2.60 -5.67 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
Annual salary adjustments -11.09 -14.69 -8.10 -11.88 -14.97 -9.08
Departures 84.94 74.70 95.12 0.94 0.86 1.02
Table 5.5: Sources of information of HRD: Average, 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles
(Q2.5% and Q97.5%) for t-values and γ coefficients
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t-values γ
Mean Q2.5% Q97.5% Mean Q2.5% Q97.5%
Initial rank -0.75 -3.12 1.95 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
Initial salary 0.20 -1.69 2.13 0.00 -0.01 0.01
Promotion to Associate 5.64 1.95 9.62 0.00 0.00 0.00
Promotion to Full 63.02 42.48 85.53 0.02 0.02 0.03
Annual salary adjustments -0.31 -2.18 1.86 -0.04 -0.33 0.25
Departures 1.43 -0.56 3.39 0.00 -0.00 0.01
Table 5.6: Sources of information of TRL2: Average, 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles
(Q2.5% and Q97.5%) for t-values and γ coefficients
t-values γ
Mean Q2.5% Q97.5% Mean Q2.5% Q97.5%
Initial rank 1.03 -1.79 3.40 0.00 -0.00 0.01
Initial salary -0.19 -2.11 1.88 -0.00 -0.02 0.02
Promotion to Associate 48.31 31.26 64.15 0.04 0.03 0.04
Promotion to Full -34.83 -60.82 -19.92 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
Annual salary adjustments -0.13 -2.22 1.82 -0.02 -0.47 0.47
Departures 0.36 -1.63 2.29 0.00 -0.00 0.01
Table 5.7: Sources of information of TRL1: Average, 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles
(Q2.5% and Q97.5%) for t-values and γ coefficients
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Chapter 6
Gender equity at University X:
institution-level analyses
We applied the simulation-based method to University X, using the following
parameters:
• Time period: 2005-2013,
• Initial ranks observed,
• No departures for newly hired faculty members at the end of first year at the
institution,
• Weighted counterfactual structure. This assumes that gender partiality (if it
exists) at University X manifests as both under compensation of female faculty
and over compensation of male faculty, with the coefficients of the gender-
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neutral scenario set to the gender-adjusted coefficients of the observed scenario.
Then, the gender-neutral structure for men does not differ from the observed
scenario and results presented will be for female faculty only.
• K = 100 realizations of the institution,
• B = 250 bootstrap samples for variance calculations.
Figure 6.1 shows comparisons between an observed and simulated gender-neutral
realization of University X, chosen at random. For this realization of University
X, the simulated observed scenario is very similar to its gender-neutral counterpart.
The simulated observed scenario shows slightly lower percentages of female departures
over time (6.1a), as well as a slightly lower percentage of female full professors (15.3%
versus 13.9% in 2013 respectively) (Figure 6.1b).
Figure 6.2 shows the estimated average institution-level causal effects of Hazard
ratio of departure (HRD), Relative total compensation (RTS) and Time in higher
rank lost at Associate and Full Professor level (TRL2 and TRL1), along with their





There are no significant departures from gender neutrality in the case of departures
and time at Full or Associate professor level. This means that female faculty depart
University X as expected if University X were gender neutral, and female faculty
do not lose any time in higher ranks. However, the percentage of money spent on
female faculty during 2005-2013 is 2.8% (95% CI [1.2%,4.4%]) higher under gender
neutrality.
The biggest contributor to the departures from gender neutrality in total compen-
sation over the 9 study years correspond to differences in initial salaries (Table 6.1),
with a t-value of -17.82, followed by differences in the annual salary adjustments (t-
value=-5.78) and differences in the promotion to associate professor (t-value=-3.01).
The rest of the the steps of the career do not have a significant contribution to the
average Relative total compensation (RTS). There were no significant interaction
between any of the career steps.
Negative β̂ coefficients for initial salary, annual salary adjustments and promotion
to Associate Professor indicate that larger gender disparities against female faculty in
these steps contribute to making RTS larger, hence to larger departures from gender
neutrality. On average:
• making initial female faculty salaries one extra percent point lower than male’s
is associated with an increase of 0.005 in RTS,
• lowering the annual salary adjustments for female faculty 0.1% with respect to
males increases the RTS by 0.00332,
97
• decreasing the hazard of promotion to Associate Professor 10 extra percent
points, increases RTS in 0.00095.
β̂∗ ŜE(β̂) t value p-value
Initial salary -0.4970 0.0279 -17.82 <0.001
Annual salary adjustment -3.3185 0.5739 -5.78 <0.001
Promotion to Associate -0.0095 0.0032 -3.01 0.0029
Promotion to Full -0.0031 0.0021 -1.48 0.14
Departures 0.0014 0.0037 0.38 0.70
Initial rank 0.0008 0.0023 0.35 0.73
Departure 2005a 0.0004 0.0013 0.28 0.78
∗β corresponds to average change in RTS per unit change in the
gender coefficient for each of the career models after adjusting for
the rest
a corresponds to an extra model for the hazard of departure for
existing faculty in 2005





In this dissertation we propose novel methods to estimate higher-level causal ef-
fects in complex systems, as well as assess the influence of individual components of
the system on the causal estimates. The methods proposed (1) account for individ-
uals nested within a larger cluster where the intervention or condition of interest is
applied to all the individuals in a complex way and (2) address the specific situation
where the aggregation level of interest corresponds to the cluster of all individuals, so
only one observation of the outcomes of interest is available (a sample size of 1). This
methodology complements the existing literature on the estimation of causal effects
when measurements are available for multiple units from the target population.
These methods were motivated by the study of gender equity in academia for a
single institution. Previous work has focused on the individual faculty member as a
study unit, and in most applications, on a single academic reward or representation
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outcome. The idea behind this methodology to assess gender equity is that the under-
standing of each step of the academic career will give us insight into the behavior of
the university as a whole. However, since academic institutions are complex systems,
by reducing their study to a single academic reward, we are ignoring the influences
of and the interactions between the academic rewards.
We defined the intervention of interest as “gender partiality” in contrast to “gen-
der neutrality”. The first term implies institutional practices that result in unequal
access to opportunities for female and male faculty, and which reflect on key aca-
demic rewards and representation outcomes such as lower initial salaries and ranks
for women, smaller annual adjustments in salary and higher rates of departure from
the institution. The use of “gender partiality” as the intervention or exposure of in-
terest instead of “gender” shifts the perspective of measurement from the individual
to the institution and attempts to reflect that the institution’s perception of gender,
and not gender itself, is the potential reason for disparities in academic rewards. This
consideration is central to this dissertation since the use of this perspective overcomes
criticisms exposed in the literature regarding the nature of gender as a causal variable.
We consider then the institution as the unit of analysis, a system made up of the
individual faculty member’s careers in seven steps: hiring, initial salary, initial rank,
promotion to Associate Professor, promotion to Full Professor, annual adjustments in
salary and departure from the institution. We focused on single-institution studies,
and defined the following institution-level outcomes for the collective of all faculty
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members at the institution, over a period of T years:
• Hazard of departure from the institution,
• Time in higher rank (Associate or Full Professor level),
• Total compensation.
From a causal inference perspective, we would like to have information for any sin-
gle institution under two scenarios: the observed scenario (potentially gender partial)
and a gender neutral scenario. In other words, to uncover the effect of potentially
gender partial practices in academic rewards and representation outcomes, we would
need to compare the observed institution to the exact same institution, under the as-
sumption of gender neutrality. This is the fundamental problem of causal inference:
we can only observe one of these potential outcomes.
What we then propose is a method that allows us to simulate the same institution
under both the observed and gender neutral scenarios, based on the fact that the
institution-level outcomes are functions of individual-level measurements, where we
do have multiple units. These methods allow us to:
1. Estimate institution-level causal effects,
2. Estimate the variance of the institution-level causal effects,
3. Determine the influence of individual components on the estimated causal ef-
fects.
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The simulation-based method estimates the average effects in 5 steps:
1. Develop a model for the observed system,
2. Estimate the model from the observed data,
3. Posit a model for the counterfactual system,
4. Simulate K realizations of the system under both scenarios. In each realization
estimate the institution-level causal effects,
5. Average over all realizations to obtain the average causal effects.
In order to actually assign causal interpretations to the effects calculated, the
assumptions of correct model specification and ergodicity (as defined by Marshall
and Galea (2014)21) need to hold.
The first assumption, correct model specification, implies that models reflect the
mechanisms at place in the institution and all relevant variables are included in the
analyses.21This also means that the models need to be well-calibrated and able to
reproduce the observed data patterns.21
The models used here represent but one possible system behavior of an academic
institution and specific applications need to be tailored to the university under study.
The method proposed can easily accommodate different mechanisms by updating
the nested career models to the necessary functional form and relevant variables for
a particular institution. Examples of this situation include the use of productivity
measures in the analyses or assuming different rewards by academic rank.
102
The assumption of ergodicity means that the average of the outcomes across real-
izations are well-defined, or that the system is stable,21 so the causal effects converge
to a fixed value as the number of realizations simulated increases. This assumption
can be investigated using the procedures outlined by Grazzini (2012).132
Results for simulated data showed that the simulation-based method correctly
captures increasing levels of gender partiality for the institution-level causal effects.
In the case of the gender neutral scenario simulation, observed non-significant de-
partures from the theoretical values of zero for RTS, TRL2 and TRL1, and 1 for
HRD (Table 5.3) might reflect two situations (1) the number of datasets generated
is not large enough to reach the theoretical average and (2) since the existing faculty
distribution is simulated under labor market conditions and assumed gender neutral
to simulate the careers for both observed and counterfactual simulations, spillover
gender partiality effects may still exist after 10 years. This could be assessed by
separating the causal effect in two parts: one attributable to new hires, and another
attributable to existing faculty members at the start of the simulation.
The variance of the estimated causal effects is estimated using bootstrapping pro-
cedures. We further propose the use of linear modeling to reduce the number of
iterations needed during bootstrap to estimate the variances. This method, along
with implemented code in R and C++ through Rcpp reduces running time by ap-
proximately 75%. Future research on this topic will include finding a combination of
the number of iterations and bootstrap samples that allow for optimal estimates of
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the variances in a short running time.
When we applied our methods to University X data, we did not find significant
deviations from gender neutrality in terms of departures of female faculty from the
University, with an average hazard of departure 6% lower than the hypothetical gender
neutral institution (HRD=0.94 95% CI [0.81,1.07]). There are also no statistically
significant losses of time in higher rank at Associate or Full Professor levels. We
estimate that 2.8 Full Professor years (95% CI [1.0,6.5]) and 2.4 Associate Professor
years (95% CI [4.5, 9.3]) are lost per 1000 female faculty years.
However, University X does not appear to be gender neutral with regard to the
total female faculty compensation over 9 years. When University X is made gender
neutral by setting its estimated gender coefficients to 0.0, the total female salaries are
3% higher representing 17.5$ million over the last nine years (95% CI [7.7,27.3].
A major limitation of the analysis above is the lack of productivity measures, which
are not currently available for University X. Productivity is a known determinant
of academic rewards. The models specified for University X might be incorrectly
specified if productivity is also linked to gender.
An advantage of the simulation-based method is that even though we may not have
information for all potential confounders (such as productivity), we can hypothesize
their behaviors and include them in the nested career models to assess their influence
on the estimated causal effects. This would constitute a sensitivity analysis that
would allow us to decide whether the collection of further information is needed to
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assess gender equity at the institution.
The choice of the appropriate gender neutral counterfactual has been controver-
sial in the decomposition technique literature. However, just as in that case, the
simulation-based method allows for comparison of different counterfactual structures.
The current method is set to handle binary exposures, however it can be naturally
extended to discrete exposures with more than 2 categories or to continuous exposures.
For example, we can assess race partiality at an institutional-level by comparing the
outcomes for White, Asian and Underrepresented Minorities to a counterfactual where
faculty members have access to the same opportunities regardless of race.
Academic institutions are but one example of complex systems in which we might
be interested in assessing higher-level effects, and the methods presented in this dis-
sertation are applicable to a wide variety of topics. The following are examples of
additional applications:
• Study of the effect a new law would have on the total revenue of a hospital
system as a function of the practice of each of its doctors,
• Investigation of the effect a new technological development would have on the
time from manufacturer to consumer of a drug, as a function of each of the
development stages.
Despite the differences that still exist in rewards and representation in academia
between female and male faculty, there has been progress in the last decade in the
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achievement of a more gender-neutral structure. We hope this dissertation will be one
more tool for academic institutions to provide all their faculty, regardless of gender,




8.1 Comments on the magnitude and shape
of contrast variances (Chapter 4)
The magnitude of the variances of the longitudinal contrasts V ar(ȳL1i − ȳL0i) is
largely determined by the variance of the random slope on treatment σ2I and, in a
smaller level, by the measurement error σ2e and the number of people per cluster J .
The larger the σ2I , σ
2
e and the smaller J , the larger the variance of the longitudinal
contrast.
The shape of the variances across clusters (in order of assignment to intervention)
is determined by the total number of measurements K and the number of measure-
ments before and after the cluster is assigned to the intervention (K0i and K1i). The
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greater the imbalance in the number of observations in the control / intervention
periods, the larger V ar(ȳL1i − ȳL0i). For a fixed number of people in each cluster,
the variance of the contrasts is symmetrical, with lower magnitudes near the middle
of the assignment-to-intervention period. The variance of the cluster-level random
intercept σ2C does not play a role in the variance of the longitudinal contrasts.
The variance of the cross-sectional contrasts V ar(ȳC1t − ȳC0t) is largely influ-
enced by the number of clusters assigned to the intervention at a particular time
point (N1t). The larger the imbalance between the number of clusters assigned
to control/intervention, the larger V ar(ȳC1t − ȳC0t). σ
2
I determines the shape of
V ar(ȳC1t − ȳC0t) across time. For σ
2
I = 0, the variances are symmetric, while for
σ2I > 0, the variances of the earlier contrasts is larger than the latter. The magnitude






e and J , with larger variances of random effects
and smaller number of people per cluster resulting in larger contrast variances.
For fixed number of measurements K, number of clusters N and assignment-
to-intervention period, the variance of the longitudinal contrasts are always smaller
than the variances of the cross-sectional contrasts when σ2I = 0, regardless of J ,
σ2ee and σ
2
C . When σ
2
I > 0 and σ
2
C = 0, the variances of the longitudinal contrasts
are generally larger than the variances of most of the cross-sectional contrasts, with
the exception of the earlier ones. However, as the magnitude of the cross-sectional
variances increases with σ2C (and the variances of the longitudinal do not), the bigger
the difference between the variances of cross-sectional and longitudinal contrasts.
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8.2 Parameters considered to generate stepped
wedge data (Chapter 4)
We generated data for a gaussian response as measured in a stepped wedge design





I , as follows:
• Linear trend in time and seasonality: both absent, trend present but seasonality
absent, both trend and seasonality present.
• Cluster size J : number of individuals per cluster: 5, 10 or 20.
• Cluster size type: fixed or random number of individuals per cluster. If random,
it is generated as a random draw from a Poisson distribution with mean J .
• Number of measurements K: 4, 12, 24 months.
• Number of clusters (N): 1/4 or 1/2 the number of measurements.
• Treatment effect: β1 = −0.1 or β1 = −0.5.
• Cluster-level variance: σ2C = 0 or σ
2
C = 0.5.
• Random slope on treatment effects: yes or no.
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